ABSTRACT
Although Chinese foreign policy certainly underwent a profound transformation with the inauguration of the “reform and opening policy” at the end of 1978, it also retained elements of continuity. Among these elements are:
An essentially goal-rational foreign policy that sets clearly prioritized strategic objectives. Some goals have been constant throughout, such as the emphasis on sovereignty, independence, and China's achievement of Great Power status. Others have been specific to a particular time period (the “general line”) while retaining pragmatic flexibility with regard to tactics. This realism and pragmatism entails a willingness to reassess that foreign policy and make significant adjustments from time to time, without necessarily acknowledging doing so (e.g., Tiananmen).
A tendency toward rhetorical hyperbole and a love for the language of absolute values and norms (“principles”), often belying the pragmatism with which policies are actually implemented. While the PRC has been involved in wars or violent altercations more often than most countries in the course of its brief existence, it does so only on the (perceived) firm ground of “principle.”
A penchant for “preceptorial diplomacy,” i.e., persuading other countries to parrot certain “principles” to establish a common normative basis for further discussions. These principles may be general, as in the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” or they may be tailor-made for a particular relationship, as in the agreements set forth in the “three communiqués” (for Sino-American relations), the “three fundamental obstacles” to normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1980s, the “basic agreements” set forth on three ceremonial occasions to govern Sino-Japanese relations, 1 or (most recently, to govern third nations' postures toward Taiwan) the “Three Nos.” Extraordinary emphasis is typically placed on the preliminary enunciation of these principles, failing which the whole relationship may be declared in jeopardy, not “normal.”
