ABSTRACT
Federalism as the organizing principle of a democratic state is considered by some authors to be superior to other types of states, because it apparently better safeguards the democratic rights of the citizens at large and of minorities in particular (see Riker 1975; Ostrom 1991; King 1993; Elazar 1995). In addition, so it has been claimed by these authors, federal states are often seen to perform better in terms of social and economic development (see also Lane and Ersson 1997). This begs the question to what extent federalism as a polity is indeed different from other democratic states (regarding its constitutional organization of public decision-making) and whether or not its material performance (i.e. enhancing public welfare) is indeed positively different from non-federal democracies (Weaver and Rockman 1993). To put it otherwise: is it true that federal democracies have an advantage over non-federal-often unitary-states in terms of their procedural and material performance? If this claim can be upheld then it would follow that the non-federal format of the national state is not only different from a federal democratic state as a structure, but particularly regarding its process of decision-making and the related outcomes, i.e. policy performance (see Elazar 1997).
