ABSTRACT
This essay attempts to examine the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein from a theological point of view. In doing so, a reading is offered that challenges the ‘establishment’ view of Wittgenstein: namely, that his work is so original that it resists criticisms levelled at philosophy of a more typical kind. The essay argues that philosophy employs three types of what can be termed ‘explanation’. The first is that form of explanation which appeals to a reality; the second is that which appeals to an ideality; and, third, there is explanation that collapses ideality into reality and reality into an ideality. It will be suggested that Wittgenstein comes within the ambit of the third form of explanation. Thus one can include his work within a more general critique of philosophical discourse developed from a theological point of view. For at a certain methodological level a ‘philosopher’ who is said to be beyond philosophy continues identically to repeat the founding moment of philosophical discourse, especially in its more metaphysical guise.
