ABSTRACT
Introduction There is little cause for surprise at the motives informing French and German relations through the 1980s and 1990s. Economic competition and political negotiation between the two states were etched into the bargaining and the deals done ‘in Europe’s name’ (Garton Ash 1993). The peculiarity of their negotiations over a new monetary regime for Europe rested on the scope of the interests at stake, and the determination both parties displayed in achieving their goals. The EU’s internal market programme, launched in the years 1985-87 to lower non-tariff barriers among member states, was cause enough to arouse interests. But the negotiations concerning a new monetary regime were bound to stir passions.1 French disquiet at Germany’s growing preponderance in Europe became evident in the late 1960s, when the Deutsche Mark (DM) began its ascent on the back of widening trade surpluses to replace sterling as the world’s second reserve currency after the dollar. The Bundesbank was seen as Europe’s de facto central bank, and chief financial officer of the German financial and corporate sectors.2
