ABSTRACT
P. 45. upon the penult. Paragraph, note. ‘Tis surprising to see the ingenious author of Alciphron alledging, that all beauty observed is solely some use perceived or imagined; for no other reason than this, that the apprehension of the use intended, occurs continually, when we are judging of the forms of chairs, doors, tables, and some other things of obvious use; and that we like those forms most, which are fittest for the use. Whereas we see, that in these very things similitude of parts is regarded, where unlike parts would be equally useful: thus the feet of a chair would be of the same use, tho’ unlike, were they equally long; tho’ one were strait, and the other bended; or one bending outwards, and the other inwards: a coffin-shape for a door would bear a more manifest aptitude to the human shape, than that which artists require. And then what is the use of these imitations of nature or of its works, in architecture? Why should a pillar please which has some of the human proportions? Is the end or use of a pillar the same as of a man? Why the imitation of other natural or well-proportioned things in the entablature? Is there then a sense of imitation, relishing it where there is no other use than this, that it naturally pleases? Again; is no man pleased with the shapes of any animals, but those which he expects use from? The shapes of the horse or the ox may promise use to the owner; but is he the only person who relishes the beauty? And is there no beauty discerned in plants, in flowers, in animals, whose use is to us unknown? But what is still more surprising, is his representing Aristotle as giving `επαινεтòν the, for the notion of the καλὸν: when he has so often told us, ‘that the καλὸν is prior to it; that we love praise from others, as it gives testimony to, and confirms our opinion of, our being possessed of virtue, or the καλὸν; and that the superior excellency of this, which we antecedently perceive, is the reason why we love praise’. See Ethic, ad Nicom. Lib. i. c. 5, and often elsewhere.’Tis true, that the καλὸν is laudable, and, as Plato asserts, all-wise, ήδύ καί ώφελιμον at last; and so does every one maintain who asserts a moral sense, in that very assertion. And yet the doctor has found out the art of making this an objection to a moral sense.
