ABSTRACT
The Tien An Man Square massacre in June 1989 was but the latest in the history of modern China of a series of bloody urban protests against the inadequacies and iniquities of central government. Virtually all of these protests-except during the very latest stages of the Communist revolution-proved futile, at least in terms of the achievement of significant change in the short run. Even so, the massacre was highly significant not only in terms of the loss of life and the open demonstration of the underlying brutality of the Communist government-and the fundamentally changed position of China within the community of nations as a result-but also in what it revealed of the internal political divisions and consequent vacillations within the highest levels of the government, especially in the days immediately before the troops were called in. The lengthy period of inaction by the government in the face of mass protest in favour of democracy and against the blatant corruption within the Party may perhaps to some extent be attributed to the visit of Mr. Gorbachev in the middle of the crisis. The inaction itself, and the ultimate-almost inconceivable-decision that was made to use extreme force, can also be seen, however, as the political culmination of a growing lack of control both over significant aspects of the liberalization of the economy that was then proceeding apace and, as a key aspect of the liberalization, at least to some degree also over people’s individual lives.
