ABSTRACT
Introduction There has been a resurgence of international political and media interest on the issue of maritime piracy1 since the early 1990s (Chalk 2008; Hong and Ng 2010; Rothe and Collins 2011), specifically in the Gulf of Aden (Bahadur 2011; Eichstaedt 2010). This is especially so considering that nowhere in the world is the rise in piracy attacks more evident than in the coastal waters of Somalia (International Maritime Bureau 2010). For example, of the 439 piracy attacks reported to the International Maritime Bureau in 2011, 275 were credited to Somali pirates (International Maritime Bureau 2011). Further reports indicate the violence used during the commission of the attacks has considerably increased (Elliott 2007), leading to Somali waters having been described in the media as “amongst the most dangerous waters in the world for shipping” (Mayoyo 1999). This global media coverage has brought piracy, an issue historically associated with legend and folklore (Chambliss 2004), into the present day and has led to increased policy responses by varying states and international actors such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN). These responses include an increase in the presence of warships in the shipping lanes that border Somalia’s coastal waters, as the UN has given member states unprecedented legal authority to pursue and combat pirates, encouraging them “to take part actively in fighting piracy” (United Nations Security Council 2008b: 3). There are now warships from as many as 30-40 different countries floating in the Gulf of Aden and in and around the coastal waters of Somalia (van Ginkel and Landman 2012) to protect international “peace and security” (United Nations Security Council 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e, 2008f) and curtail the threat posed by Somali pirates. Contrary to other literature addressing Somali piracy as a threat to international peace and security (Chalk 2008; Engels 2007; Gibson 2009; Hawkes
2001), and therefore supporting the militarized response to the problem, the focus of this chapter is the presentation of the Somali pirate as both perpetrator and victim. While acknowledging the weakened state infrastructure and the humanitarian situation that has plagued the Somali people for over 20 years (Eichstaedt 2010; Hastings 2009; Rothe and Collins 2011), I situate the motivations for Somali piracy within a structural victimization that extends beyond the economic conditions within Somalia, to include a re-victimization of those caught perpetrating piracy as the anti-piracy policies are enforced. This creates a duality where the pirates of Somalia are both victim and perpetrator.
