ABSTRACT
This chapter presents the reading of the arguments for the principles of induction and utility, which suggests that Mill does not attempt to move from a non-normative starting point to normative conclusions, but rather draws on the already normative character of pretheoretical dispositions to form beliefs and desires. The chapter explains that Kant employs the same strategy in his appeal to "common human reason", and sketch the basic connection of this strategy in Kant's work to his transcendental idealism. Scientific induction appeals to moves already recognized as reasonable- but the chapter must consider how such prescientific inductions come to be seen as reasonable. The Naturalistic Fallacy as applied to theoretical reason: Open Question Arguments threaten theoretical norms in just the same way as practical norms, and this is exactly the wedge that opens up the problem of induction. Whereas theoretical reason concerns what there is reason to believe, 'Practical Reason' concerns 'Teleology, or the Doctrine of Ends'.
