Germany, 1800–1945

The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was the institutional umbrella under which the original concentration of Germans in the region north of what became Italy and east of what became France carried on their commercial, agrarian, and political activities. It was an umbrella fashioned from the flimsiest materials. Beginning with the rule of Charlemagne who was crowned Emperor the Romans in 800 ce, the bulk of Germans resided in a region that in principle, though not in practice, claimed to revive the Roman Empire. With the crowning of Otto I as the first official emperor in 962 ce, a form of weak confederated government was created that lasted until 1806 when Francis II abdicated as the last ruler of a region that Napoleon’s armies had rendered a dead letter. The Empire had no army. It had no system of common law. Maintaining peace was largely left to the rulers of over 300 separate sovereign jurisdictions that belonged to the confederation. There was no centralized system of taxation. At least through the medieval period the organization of the Empire was highly decentralized reflecting feudalism at its fever pitch. Many of the princes who exercised local authority were descendents of counts who had originally been selected by the imperial family and its bureaucracy to dispense law within their locality, receiving fiefs in compensation. As feudalism became increasingly formalized, the fiefs became hereditary, thereby becoming the de facto jurisdictions over which royal households exercised hereditary rule. As feudalistic practices of hierarchically infused exchange of services and obligations gradually gave way to a more monetized market oriented system of exchange, and as some of the German states with the Empire grew while others atrophied the nature of the confederation evolved to a degree. For instance, the emergence of Prussia as a major player on the diplomatic stage and a major counterweight to Austria during the course of the eighteenth century completely reshaped the political give and take in the confederation. By the middle of the eighteenth century the composition for the confederation included whales – Prussia and Austria – and minnows. In the ranks of the small fish were electoral princes, spiritual and secular princes, counts, fifty-one free towns. The minuscule domain of the Reichsritter in Swabia was the epitome of the minnow. Each of these units had its own traditions, perhaps had its own castles or estates, and after the Reformation, or to be more precise after the end of the Thirty Years Wars, its own officially sanctioned religion. There was a weak possibility of driving through a solid constitution for the federation insofar as the whales and mid-sized fish could hammer through reforms provided they could agree on a common strategy. But for all intents and purposes this was a difficult trick to carry out, particularly when Prussia and Austria were at loggerheads. On paper there were two centers of power in the Empire. One was the Emperor who was elected by representatives of a small subgroup of the states, the electors. For many generations elections were uncontested in practice, the Habsburgs claiming the nominal title of authority. The other center of power was the Reichstag, the legislative body. It consisted of three classes. The highest class consisted of the electors. The second class contained the princes, divided

into two subgroups spiritual and temporal. The third class was the council of imperial cities, again subdivided into two college subgroups: Swabia and the Rhine. In addition, the Empire had imperial courts. In principle the Holy Roman Empire represented the great majority of Germans, providing them with a seat at the table of great powers negotiating over war and peace. In practice the weakness of the federation undermined any claim to genuine geopolitical power. As Hume said in 1748:3 “Germany is undoubtedly a very fine country full of industrious people and were it would be united it would be the greatest power that ever was in the world.” Of course the problem was that disunity, rather than unity, prevailed. As Germans moved eastward they left the territories contained in the Holy Roman Empire. This movement through a combination of conquest or peaceful commerce and settlement was sufficiently powerful to take on names. To Germans it was known as Ostkolonisation (colonization of the East); to peoples residing in the lands to the east its name was more ominous: Drang nach Osten (drive to the East). One major driver of German migration into Central Europe was invitation by rules of states. In a world of states – not nation-states – encouraging in-migration of cultural subgroups was perceived as a part of a strategy of diversifying economic activity – acquiring small ethnic communities enjoying special skills whether in craft production, mining or farming – and rapidly filling out unutilized frontier lands. Rulers in Poland, Bohemia-Moravia, Hungary-Croatia, Lithuania sought out Germans who could set up mining operations, for instance. Through this mechanism of state consolidation a community of Zipser Germans was established in the twelfth century and prospered in the mountains separating Slovakia from Galicia. In the thirteenth century German enclaves were carved out in Transylvania, the so-called Transylvanian Saxons. North of the Carpathians Germans replaced Slavic residents throughout the Oder River region reaching into the environs known as upper Silesia. Over time, partly with the encouragement of Czech rulers, Germans moved in the mountains around Bohemia and Moravia. Out of these communities emerged the group known as Sudeten Germans. After the Habsburgs pushed the Ottomans out of Ottoman Hungary in the eighteenth century, the regime invited Germans in to settle lands around the Danube. This group came to be called Danube Swabians. Finally, in 1763 an invitation by Catherine II of Russia brought German colonists into the Volga region. Subsequently as the Ottoman retreat southward allowed Russian advances in the Black Sea environs, German communities sprang up in the lands north and west of the Sea (Black Sea Germans to the north, Bessarussian Germans to the east). To be sure, not all of these groups consisted of persons originally ethnic German. Some members of the communities that formed in Central Europe were Slavs, Magyars, or Poles who learned German or who married Germans. That said, there was a very important component of the settlement to the East that accentuated the German nature of the advance: the development of German law cities. The rulers who invited in the migrants typically offered special

privileges to the settlers. One special privilege was self-government: their own courts, their own city councils, their own military organizations. These packages of special privileges were sufficiently important and widely spread that they commanded their own popular designation: German city law (Deutsches Stadtrecht). There were three major types: Lübeck law prevailed in the north, in the Baltic seaports, in important ports like Danzig (Gdańsk); NeumarkMagdeburg Law spread throughout a broad middle zone in Central Europe (including Cracow); and South German Law spread throughout the Drava River and Danube River basins. Of course all of this testifies to the fragmentation of the German communities from which the migrants came. Since the Holy Roman Empire was highly diverse, politically and culturally fragmented, so were the German migrant communities that sprang up in the east. The Germans were not the only group invited into the empires and kingdoms that controlled territories in Central Europe. The Jews were an important second group.4 There were two distinct groups of Jews with two separate geographic patterns of migration throughout Europe: Ashkenazim and Sephardim. In 1900 of the approximately 10 million Jews worldwide, over 70 percent were Ashkenazim residing in Central Europe. In general the Ashkenazim originally came out of the Holy Roman Empire, speaking a version of German that incorporates Hebrew and Slavic words, Yiddish. Encouraged to move out of the Holy Roman Empire as persecution of their communities intensified during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Ashkenazim community increasingly gravitated toward Poland. After Poland joined with Lithuania to move the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Jews moved into the eastern reaches of the Commonwealth, particularly in the regions known as Lithuania, Belarus, and the Ukraine. With the collapse of the Polish-Lithuania Commonwealth and the division of Poland in the eighteenth century (Prussia, Austria, and Russia basically carving up Poland that had de facto become a Russian dependency between 1772 and 1795), most of the Ashkenazim ended up residing in areas controlled by Russia. This area eventually became known as the Pale of Settlement or Pale. By contrast the Sephardim were mainly concentrated in the Mediterranean region: originally in Spain (from which they were driven out, migrating to North Africa and the Ottoman Empire) and the Balkans. Some settled in Greece, only to flee later as the citizens of Greece, having broken free of the Ottomans – arguing that the Jews had assisted the Ottomans in keeping the Greeks from rebelling (with some truth behind it) – began prosecuting their communities. The Jewish communities left in the Holy Roman Empire, their ranks now depleted, were in a peculiar position. Some became quite successful by becoming court Jews, lending funds to the rulers of the – often small – states that populated the Holy Roman Empire.5 During the Thirty Years War financing of war became increasingly important in the states of the Holy Roman Empire, promoting the demand for the services of court Jews, enhancing their status. Indeed, many of the court Jews were granted special privileges by the rulers of the states, just as German settlers were accorded special privileges in their communities established in the east. However, the Jewish community that remained German

shrank dramatically in size despite the enhanced status of a small subgroup of court Jews. The buildup of military force in selected German states during the eighteenth century evident in Panel B of Table 6.1 speaks to the peculiar situation of Jews remaining in Germany. It is clear that the prosperity of a select group of financiers within the German Jewish community was enhanced even in the face of considerable hostility towards Jews that was being expressed at a general level within German lands. Indeed, there is no better illustration of Jew-hatred than the views of Martin Luther. In 1542 he uttered:6 “I am no Jew, but I do not like to think in earnest about the wrath of God against this people.” Luther was responding to the fact that Jews refused to convert to Christianity. Beyond this he probably believed that as “Christ-killers” they were implacable enemies of Christendom, archcriminals to the bone, a “plague, pestilence and [source of] pure misfortunate.” To boot they wanted to rule the world. Since they would not convert they should be expelled. To be sure, one did not need to be Protestant to despise and distrust Jews on religious grounds. Hilberg (1985: 10-11) provides an interesting table comparing anti-Jewish policies advocated by the Catholic Church in the form of Canonical Laws adopted between 306 ce and 1434 with Nazi measures instituted in Nazi Germany. The correspondence is remarkably close. Indeed, the Catholic Church turned its back on the plight of the Jews during the years of extermination in Europe between 1941 and 1945. That the mass killing extermination centers established by the Nazis were all located in Catholic Poland testifies to the overlap between “good old-fashioned Jew hating” and the willingness to turn a blind eye to the barbaric cruelties of the Shoah. In sum, both Germans and Jews moved into Central Europe in response to opportunities offered up by dynastic states (or the case of Poland-Lithuania a constitutional monarchy whose king was elected by a diet of nobles). In the case of the Jews exiting the Holy Roman Empire was a strong incentive to move; in the case of the Germans the carrot was the chance to improve oneself economically. In any case the crucial point is that the locus and status of the population concentrations established in the east depended on the geopolitical realities of Central Europe. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the geopolitics of Central Europe changed dramatically. At the beginning of the seventeenth century two of the most powerful states in Central Europe were the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire. Both declined during the course of the following two centuries, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth disappearing in a series of three partitions between 1772 and 1795. In the case of the Ottoman initial weakness was demonstrated in 1683 when the Ottoman forces were decisively smashed in the outskirts of Vienna. The gradual transformation of Central Europe was the product of military confrontations. Three states emerged as the new power brokers of the region: Protestant Prussia; the Catholic Habsburg Empire based in Austria; and the defender of Orthodox Christianity, Russia. All three states took advantage of

internal weaknesses in Poland-Lithuania (a noble democracy adhering to a cumbersome constitution that was easily subverted by foreign intrigue and an inability to fund a strong army due to internal dissension). The failure of the Ottomans to keep up with the military improvements being made in Europe rendered them vulnerable as well. The expansion of Russian power between the fifteenth century and the late eighteenth century is remarkable as an illustration of effective state building in a pre-nation-state world. Exploiting the ebbing of Mongol power in the 1400s, Muscovy emerged as a major power in the sixteenth century, absorbing territories once ruled by khanates. Developing the fur trade brought Russian military aggrandizement into Siberia. Promoting Cossack rebellions in Poland-Lithuania after the end of the Thirty Years War brought the Cossacks on the lower Dnieper under the Russian military umbrella. Confronting the Swedes in the Baltic in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, Peter the Great managed to secure control over Livonia and Estonia, establishing St. Petersburg in the swamps as a window on the Baltic. Beating back the Tartar khanate in the Crimea, Catherine the Great gradually pushed Russian power in the environs of the Black Sea. Arranging with Prussia and Austria to carve up Poland-Lithuania – Frederick the Great quipped that this was like carving up an artichoke – allowed Russia to extend its power deeper into Central Europe. Through this process Russia emerged as the “pivot area” of the Eurasian landmass, the only power astride both East Asian and European geopolitical zones. The gradual aggrandizement of Prussian power, though less dramatic than that of Russia, was also remarkable. Beginning like Muscovy as a small entity – the Electorate of Brandenburg – Prussia built up its power through a combination of diplomacy, dynastic alliances, and success on the battlefield.7 In particular the military was crucial in the Prussian case. Why was a relatively small state established within the Holy Roman Empire able to punch beyond its weight? There is little doubt that the disciplinary revolution played a crucial role in the military success of Prussia-Brandenburg.8 In 1613 the Elector John Sigismund converted to Calvinism, setting in motion a situation where a Calvinist line of the Hohenzollerns entrenched in the northern reaches of the Holy Roman Empire was ruling a territory that was largely committed to

the Lutheran confession. As can be seen from Table 6.1 the result was a steady Calvinization of the Prussian Royal Service that was carried out systematically by Frederick William (the Great Elector) who ruled Brandenburg from 1640 until 1688. What Calvinism brought to the Prussian state, especially to its military, was discipline. Gorski (2003: 96-97) points to three changes that occurred in the operation of the Prussian Army under the rule of Frederick William I who acceded to the throne upon the death of the Great Elector: standardized drilling; drilling with great intensity; and drilling supervised by officers, not by low level drill sergeants. Under the system of drilling governed by the royal Reglement every step of a complex drilling schedule was laid out in minute detail, requiring hours and hours of practice to master (for instance how to place one’s fingers on a rifle grip was elaborated in detail); second drilling took place between March and May on a systematic basis, often starting at 5 am in the morning; finally, to advance in the ranks, officers had to demonstrate their prowess in drilling their soldiers in an exact and precise fashion. As a result, Prussian soldiers were able to perform maneuvers at great speed, for instance executing rapid firing of muskets, a prime feature of war making that distinguished Dutch soldiers in their wars of liberation overthrowing the Spanish yoke. The development of Pietism, more practical and worldly than either Lutheranism and Calvinism – one sees echoes of the English levelers in this orientation – during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries added a third confession to the Protestantism of Prussia. Together all three confessions made Prussia a relatively disciplined state, one capable of raising taxes from a relatively obedient populace without relying on excessive monitoring to do so. To be sure, as can be seen from Panel B of Table 6.1, Prussia was not the only German state to expand its military throughout the eighteenth century. But the data makes it quite clear that Prussia was the most successful in beefing up its forces. Indeed, a combination of rising troop strength and discipline coupled with dedicated leadership ability allowed Frederick the Great to expand the boundaries of Prussia by acquiring Silesia through victories in two major mideighteenth century wars, the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War. Coupled with early gains (Eastern Pomerania and Magdeburg were taken over in 1648), the seizure of Silesia provided the boost in power needed by Frederick the Great to give him a strong hand in carving up the “Polish artichoke” beginning with 1772 (the process was completed by his successor). In this way Prussia emerged as the second most powerful state – after Habsburg Austria – within the multi-state system known as the Holy Roman Empire.