ABSTRACT
The March 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident spurred expectations in the Japanese public and around the world that Japan would pull the plug on nuclear energy.1 Indeed, in July 2011 Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced that he no longer believed that nuclear reactors could be operated safely in Japan because it is so prone to devastating earthquakes and tsunami; by May 2012 all of Japan’s 50 viable reactors were shut down for safety inspections. Plans to boost nuclear energy to 50% of Japan’s electricity generating capacity were scrapped and the government enacted subsidies to boost renewable energy. Controversially, however, in June 2012 Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda (2011-12) approved the restart of two nuclear reactors, sparking mass protests that continued throughout Japan’s summer of discontent, the largest since the turbulent 1960s. Three major investigations into the Fukushima accident were released in 2012,
detailing the absence of a culture of safety in the nuclear industry and the cozy and collusive relations between regulators and the utilities that compromised safety (Funabashi Report 2012; Hatamura Report 2012; National Diet Report 2012). All three investigations assert that the meltdowns were preventable, and refuted Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) claim that the massive tsunami was an inconceivable event that caused the three meltdowns and hydrogen explosions (Lukner and Sakaki 2013). Finally, in October 2012, TEPCO confessed that it had erred in not adopting stricter
safety measures and could have prevented the nuclear crisis had it done so (Asahi, October 13, 2012). TEPCO’s in-house investigation report issued in mid-2012 flatly denied responsibility or shortchanging safety (TEPCO 2012), but a subsequent TEPCO reform panel including international experts came to completely different conclusions. TEPCO finally acknowledged what had been extensively reported about its downplaying of tsunami risk and resistance to adopting international safety standards. It also admitted that employees were not properly trained to operate emergency equipment and lacked crisis management skills. The utility concedes that it did not manage risk properly because it feared that any measures to improve safety at the Fukushima plant would stoke the anti-nuclear movement, interfere with operations, raise costs, and create legal and political problems. This mea culpa is an extraordinary development, one that highlights the shortcomings and wrongdoing of the nuclear village. These damning revelations about the absence of a culture of safety undermine public
faith in regulators and the utilities and seemed to suggest that Japan might gradually phase out nuclear power. The government solicited public opinion in the summer of 2012 and found that 81% of respondents favored eliminating nuclear energy by 2030 (Kingston 2012c). Despite overwhelming anti-nuclear public sentiments, however, the Noda cabinet did not officially endorse the nuclear-free option, and left the energy
policy door open to further deliberation while allowing construction of new reactors to resume. Moreover, the new Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) is headed by a prominent pro-nuclear expert, and is mostly staffed by former members of the discredited Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) which were blamed for regulating in favor of the regulated and lax monitoring of nuclear reactor operators. New safety guidelines issued by the NRA indicate that it is serious about improving safety at Japan’s reactors, requiring costly upgrades, strict monitoring, and delays in restarts, but Prime Minister Abe Shinzo (2012-) is a determined proponent of nuclear energy. Why has Fukushima not been a game-changing event? This paper examines the
institutional actors in nuclear energy and their resilience in the face of public anger and anxieties. These institutions enjoy considerable advantages in terms of energy policy making and have enormous investments at stake.
