ABSTRACT
The contemporary sociology and economics of science describe the organization of scientific research, especially in experimental sciences, as necessarily ‘entrepreneurial’. Scientists at the head of large laboratories perform a number of activities which are typical of the modern entrepreneur, such as setting up and managing increasingly complex organizations, and providing them with
adequate funding and human capital. More generally, scientists with innovative research agendas have to relate frequently with agents outside the universities (especially policy-makers and industrialists), in order to find political and material support for that agenda. The starting point of many recent essays is Robert Merton’s portrait of academic scientists as individuals engaged in careers based upon peers’ recognition of their contributions to the advancement of scientific knowledge (Merton 1973). In Merton’s view, such recognition takes primarily the form of ‘scientific credit’, which is given to any scientist whose ‘priority claim’ over a discovery is acknowledged by the scientific community at large. Philosophers and economists of science have gone a long way in exploring how the quest for scientific credit may shape social relationships in science, and have reinforced the notion that being credited with one or more ‘discoveries’ (through the mechanism of bibliographic citations and, possibly, eponymy) is essential to a scientist’s career (Kitcher 1993; Dasgupta and David 1994). An even more complex view of how scientists manage their careers according to entrepreneurial criteria comes from the sociological tradition of ‘science studies’ (Callon 2002), and a number of related contributions to the history of science and technology (Latour 1988; Lenoir 1997). This literature explores in greater depth the relational aspect of the scientific enterprise. Scientific facts are not merely ‘discovered’ by the first scientist who solves a theoretical puzzle or creates an innovative experimental routine (and thus wins the priority race). Rather, they are established by obtaining social consensus on the relevance of the topic, on the legitimacy of the theoretical assumptions, and on the solidity of experimental routines. Such consensus has to be gained both from fellow scientists (especially within one’s own disciplinary field) and from other relevant actors, such as businessmen and policymakers. Fellow scientists can validate the contents of a scientific paper or programme by citing it as a legitimate source of information, or neglect it as irrelevant or poorly conceived. Their consensus has to be elicited either by indirect means (e.g. by choosing the best publication outlet or through a perfunctory use of paper citations) or by more direct ones, by establishing social ties through research cooperation, conference invitations and joint lobbying for economic resources from state and industry. In this respect, businessmen and policy-makers can be instrumental in providing funds, data, scientific materials and instruments, as well as ethical validation. Participation to science policy forums, policy and ethical committees, and scientific boards of large companies are all necessary activities for senior scientists to support the activity of their laboratories. If seen within this context, IPR management, consultancy and equity participation to spin-off companies are not simply market and market-like alternative activities, but indeed necessary steps, conditional to the scientific entrepreneur’s chief goal of setting up or expanding her lab, and promoting her academic career (OECD 1999: 37).
