ABSTRACT
Like snowflakes and memories, the content of any two individuals’ conscience is not identical. But, as explained in the introductory chapter of this book, shared in common are the three facets of conscience that Broad (1973) delineated. Broad’s and Langston’s (2001) characterizations of the three conscience-related processes and the ease of identification in the English language (see Chapter 1) dovetail nicely with several, though not all, approaches to the development of morality (cf. Blasi, 1983, 1999; Hoffman, 1983, 2000; Kohlberg, 1984; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1988). In many analyses of moral development, emotions, feelings, and affect play central roles in the engagement of moral and immoral actions throughout the lifespan (e.g., Hoffman, 1982, 1998, 2000; Kochanska, Aksan, & Knaack, 2004).
As with longstanding debates in philosophy contrasting the role of rational deliberation and emotion in morality (cf. Haidt, 2003), certain experts in moral development eschew the relevance of any emotion to the cultivation of moral cognition, reasoning, decision-making, behaviour, and commitment (Blasi, 2005). They deny the centrality of emotions to the moral realm because – unlike moral decisions, identities, or acts – emotions themselves are not intentional or chosen (but see De Rivera & Grinkis, 1986). Blasi argues that individuals report intense or chronic negative feelings regarding events they did not cause, events for which they do not “deserve” to feel bad, or ones that they caused purely by accident. Although people also experience these reactions regarding intentional acts, it is unwise to ground moral motivation in states that may result from pure happenstance.
