Breadcrumbs Section. Click here to navigate to respective pages.
Chapter
Chapter
public policy, a particularly favoured device in the 1960s and 1970s. Reliance on public policy rationale can be referred to as the ‘grand style’ or the ‘teleological’ approach. Cases may also turn on the form of the statute itself, that is, its internal context. Much of the analysis engaged in here is at the level of the internal. However, never forget the external world context. Judges who rigidly adopt the internal approach are often referred to as formalists. Such judges say that they do not create law, they find it. They find it by following the pathways of the rules of statutory interpretation by moving within the document this is the statute. A closer consideration of the simplest definitions of the rules of statutory interpretation enables the classification of the literal rule as the formalist approach and the mischief rule as the teleological approach. The golden rule, of course, allows one to ignore the formalist approach of the literal rule. It is most likely to result in a teleological approach as the judge, through the golden rule, is released from formalism! (See Figure 3.2, above, in Chapter 3.) 4.8.2 Case study of Mandla v Dowell Lee Read the extract from the judgment of Lord Fraser in the case of Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 1 All ER 118 in Appendix 1 and then read and reflect on the following discussion based upon the reading of the judgment as giving examples of formalism and a teleological approach. The case of Mandla v Dowell Lee involved the interpretation of legislative provisions in the Race Relations Act 1976 and went through both appellate courts (the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords) surrounded by much publicity. The crux of the case concerned whether Sikhs constituted an ethnic group and could claim the protection of the Race Relations Act 1976. The Court of Appeal decided that Sikhs did not constitute a racial group and could not claim the protection of the Race Relations Act. It was an unpopular decision, taken two days before Lord Denning MR’s retirement as Master of the Rolls (the senior judge in the Court of Appeal) and caused rioting in the streets before a quick reversal of the Court of Appeal’s decision by the House of Lords. The particular legislative provisions were ss 1 and 3 of the Race Relations Act 1976. Section 3 was the gateway provision. If this section gave Sikhs protection, then the Act applied and the claim under s 1 could be made. More particularly, the entire case revolved around the interpretation of three words. The meaning of the word ‘ethnic’ in s 3 and the meaning of the words ‘can’ and ‘justifiable’ in s 1. The case is a good example of the movement from theoretical rules to their interpretation and application in reality; a movement from rules in books, to the legal construction of reality. It is also a good illustration of the power of the appellate court to determine the meaning of legislation. The facts of the case were that Mr Mandla, a Sikh, wanted his son to go to a private secondary school. The child was offered a place which was subsequently revoked when the father informed the school that the child would not remove his turban as school uniform rules required. The headmaster stated that the rules concerning uniform were rigid and that other Sikh pupils removed turbans during
DOI link for public policy, a particularly favoured device in the 1960s and 1970s. Reliance on public policy rationale can be referred to as the ‘grand style’ or the ‘teleological’ approach. Cases may also turn on the form of the statute itself, that is, its internal context. Much of the analysis engaged in here is at the level of the internal. However, never forget the external world context. Judges who rigidly adopt the internal approach are often referred to as formalists. Such judges say that they do not create law, they find it. They find it by following the pathways of the rules of statutory interpretation by moving within the document this is the statute. A closer consideration of the simplest definitions of the rules of statutory interpretation enables the classification of the literal rule as the formalist approach and the mischief rule as the teleological approach. The golden rule, of course, allows one to ignore the formalist approach of the literal rule. It is most likely to result in a teleological approach as the judge, through the golden rule, is released from formalism! (See Figure 3.2, above, in Chapter 3.) 4.8.2 Case study of Mandla v Dowell Lee Read the extract from the judgment of Lord Fraser in the case of Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 1 All ER 118 in Appendix 1 and then read and reflect on the following discussion based upon the reading of the judgment as giving examples of formalism and a teleological approach. The case of Mandla v Dowell Lee involved the interpretation of legislative provisions in the Race Relations Act 1976 and went through both appellate courts (the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords) surrounded by much publicity. The crux of the case concerned whether Sikhs constituted an ethnic group and could claim the protection of the Race Relations Act 1976. The Court of Appeal decided that Sikhs did not constitute a racial group and could not claim the protection of the Race Relations Act. It was an unpopular decision, taken two days before Lord Denning MR’s retirement as Master of the Rolls (the senior judge in the Court of Appeal) and caused rioting in the streets before a quick reversal of the Court of Appeal’s decision by the House of Lords. The particular legislative provisions were ss 1 and 3 of the Race Relations Act 1976. Section 3 was the gateway provision. If this section gave Sikhs protection, then the Act applied and the claim under s 1 could be made. More particularly, the entire case revolved around the interpretation of three words. The meaning of the word ‘ethnic’ in s 3 and the meaning of the words ‘can’ and ‘justifiable’ in s 1. The case is a good example of the movement from theoretical rules to their interpretation and application in reality; a movement from rules in books, to the legal construction of reality. It is also a good illustration of the power of the appellate court to determine the meaning of legislation. The facts of the case were that Mr Mandla, a Sikh, wanted his son to go to a private secondary school. The child was offered a place which was subsequently revoked when the father informed the school that the child would not remove his turban as school uniform rules required. The headmaster stated that the rules concerning uniform were rigid and that other Sikh pupils removed turbans during
public policy, a particularly favoured device in the 1960s and 1970s. Reliance on public policy rationale can be referred to as the ‘grand style’ or the ‘teleological’ approach. Cases may also turn on the form of the statute itself, that is, its internal context. Much of the analysis engaged in here is at the level of the internal. However, never forget the external world context. Judges who rigidly adopt the internal approach are often referred to as formalists. Such judges say that they do not create law, they find it. They find it by following the pathways of the rules of statutory interpretation by moving within the document this is the statute. A closer consideration of the simplest definitions of the rules of statutory interpretation enables the classification of the literal rule as the formalist approach and the mischief rule as the teleological approach. The golden rule, of course, allows one to ignore the formalist approach of the literal rule. It is most likely to result in a teleological approach as the judge, through the golden rule, is released from formalism! (See Figure 3.2, above, in Chapter 3.) 4.8.2 Case study of Mandla v Dowell Lee Read the extract from the judgment of Lord Fraser in the case of Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 1 All ER 118 in Appendix 1 and then read and reflect on the following discussion based upon the reading of the judgment as giving examples of formalism and a teleological approach. The case of Mandla v Dowell Lee involved the interpretation of legislative provisions in the Race Relations Act 1976 and went through both appellate courts (the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords) surrounded by much publicity. The crux of the case concerned whether Sikhs constituted an ethnic group and could claim the protection of the Race Relations Act 1976. The Court of Appeal decided that Sikhs did not constitute a racial group and could not claim the protection of the Race Relations Act. It was an unpopular decision, taken two days before Lord Denning MR’s retirement as Master of the Rolls (the senior judge in the Court of Appeal) and caused rioting in the streets before a quick reversal of the Court of Appeal’s decision by the House of Lords. The particular legislative provisions were ss 1 and 3 of the Race Relations Act 1976. Section 3 was the gateway provision. If this section gave Sikhs protection, then the Act applied and the claim under s 1 could be made. More particularly, the entire case revolved around the interpretation of three words. The meaning of the word ‘ethnic’ in s 3 and the meaning of the words ‘can’ and ‘justifiable’ in s 1. The case is a good example of the movement from theoretical rules to their interpretation and application in reality; a movement from rules in books, to the legal construction of reality. It is also a good illustration of the power of the appellate court to determine the meaning of legislation. The facts of the case were that Mr Mandla, a Sikh, wanted his son to go to a private secondary school. The child was offered a place which was subsequently revoked when the father informed the school that the child would not remove his turban as school uniform rules required. The headmaster stated that the rules concerning uniform were rigid and that other Sikh pupils removed turbans during
ABSTRACT
Cases may also turn on the form of the statute itself, that is, its internal context. Much of the analysis engaged in here is at the level of the internal. However, never forget the external world context. Judges who rigidly adopt the internal approach are often referred to as formalists. Such judges say that they do not create law, they find it. They find it by following the pathways of the rules of statutory interpretation by moving within the document this is the statute.