ABSTRACT
One reason why a general theory of obligations is something that has little meaning for the common lawyer is that, as we have mentioned, the common lawyer is more used to thinking at the level of remedies and of specific causes of action. Of course, a remedies-orientated approach need not be incompatible with a law of obligations, as Roman law itself has shown (Chapter 1); and the remedies and causes of action to be found in the common law can sometimes be related to ideas in the civil codes. But, it has to be remembered that in terms of institutions the remedy and the cause of action can often act as a focal point for both substantive and procedural relations and rules. If these rules do not connect to a scientifically orientated model of real and personal relations, then it is unlikely that the remedies will conform to a rationalised model. For there is no science of remedies as such. In addition, the forms of action have left a legacy, as we have seen with the Esso case (Chapter 1 § 7(a)), of procedural thinking that stretches beyond the conduct of the litigation itself and into the area of substantive rights. No work on the English law of obligations can ever ignore this legacy.
