machinery was foreseeably dangerous: Hindle and Another, Appellants v Birtwistle, Respondent (1897). However, if the machinery were dangerous, it had to be fenced, even though it was not practicable to do so because fencing would render the machine (for example, a grindstone) unusable (John Summers & Sons Ltd v Frost (1955)). This rule did not apply when the general fencing requirement had been relaxed by special regulations in respect of the particular class of machine. The duty to fence transmission machinery was an absolute one. In Carroll v Andrew Barclay & Sons Ltd (1946) it was held that the duty was only to prevent workers getting access to the dangerous parts, not to prevent them being injured by broken parts flying out from the machinery. Similarly, the strict duty to fence dangerous parts of machinery other than transmission machinery did not extend to protecting the worker from injury by work pieces being thrown out by the machinery (Nicholls v F Austin (Leyton) Ltd (1946)). In arriving at their decision in Carroll, the House of Lords considered a number of other cases, including most of those mentioned in this and the preceding paragraph. The fencing provisions referred to in these cases were re-enacted in successive Factories Acts and were law for at least a century. They have ceased to apply since 1 January 1993 and it is very unlikely that there are still to be litigated cases concerning their applicability to accidents occurring before this date. It will be interesting to see whether any of these older cases will have any bearing on the interpretation of the new fencing provision in regulation 11 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998. Since the new provisions include requirements ‘to prevent access to any dangerous part of machinery’, it is arguable that the old authorities will remain of relevance. Interestingly, a successful claim has now been brought against an employer for breach of regulation 6(1) of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992 (now regulation 5(1) of the Regulations as re-issued in 1998). This regulation stipulates that ‘every employer shall ensure that work equipment is maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and in good repair’. In Stark v The Post Office (2000) the claimant appealed against a decision of the High Court dismissing his claim for damages on the ground that the defendant employer was neither liable in negligence nor for breach of statutory duty. The claimant suffered serious personal injury when the front brake broke on the bicycle he was riding when delivering mail. The judge’s unchallenged finding of fact was that the cause of the brake failure was either

DOI link for machinery was foreseeably dangerous: Hindle and Another, Appellants v Birtwistle, Respondent (1897). However, if the machinery were dangerous, it had to be fenced, even though it was not practicable to do so because fencing would render the machine (for example, a grindstone) unusable (John Summers & Sons Ltd v Frost (1955)). This rule did not apply when the general fencing requirement had been relaxed by special regulations in respect of the particular class of machine. The duty to fence transmission machinery was an absolute one. In Carroll v Andrew Barclay & Sons Ltd (1946) it was held that the duty was only to prevent workers getting access to the dangerous parts, not to prevent them being injured by broken parts flying out from the machinery. Similarly, the strict duty to fence dangerous parts of machinery other than transmission machinery did not extend to protecting the worker from injury by work pieces being thrown out by the machinery (Nicholls v F Austin (Leyton) Ltd (1946)). In arriving at their decision in Carroll, the House of Lords considered a number of other cases, including most of those mentioned in this and the preceding paragraph. The fencing provisions referred to in these cases were re-enacted in successive Factories Acts and were law for at least a century. They have ceased to apply since 1 January 1993 and it is very unlikely that there are still to be litigated cases concerning their applicability to accidents occurring before this date. It will be interesting to see whether any of these older cases will have any bearing on the interpretation of the new fencing provision in regulation 11 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998. Since the new provisions include requirements ‘to prevent access to any dangerous part of machinery’, it is arguable that the old authorities will remain of relevance. Interestingly, a successful claim has now been brought against an employer for breach of regulation 6(1) of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992 (now regulation 5(1) of the Regulations as re-issued in 1998). This regulation stipulates that ‘every employer shall ensure that work equipment is maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and in good repair’. In Stark v The Post Office (2000) the claimant appealed against a decision of the High Court dismissing his claim for damages on the ground that the defendant employer was neither liable in negligence nor for breach of statutory duty. The claimant suffered serious personal injury when the front brake broke on the bicycle he was riding when delivering mail. The judge’s unchallenged finding of fact was that the cause of the brake failure was either

machinery was foreseeably dangerous: Hindle and Another, Appellants v Birtwistle, Respondent (1897). However, if the machinery were dangerous, it had to be fenced, even though it was not practicable to do so because fencing would render the machine (for example, a grindstone) unusable (John Summers & Sons Ltd v Frost (1955)). This rule did not apply when the general fencing requirement had been relaxed by special regulations in respect of the particular class of machine. The duty to fence transmission machinery was an absolute one. In Carroll v Andrew Barclay & Sons Ltd (1946) it was held that the duty was only to prevent workers getting access to the dangerous parts, not to prevent them being injured by broken parts flying out from the machinery. Similarly, the strict duty to fence dangerous parts of machinery other than transmission machinery did not extend to protecting the worker from injury by work pieces being thrown out by the machinery (Nicholls v F Austin (Leyton) Ltd (1946)). In arriving at their decision in Carroll, the House of Lords considered a number of other cases, including most of those mentioned in this and the preceding paragraph. The fencing provisions referred to in these cases were re-enacted in successive Factories Acts and were law for at least a century. They have ceased to apply since 1 January 1993 and it is very unlikely that there are still to be litigated cases concerning their applicability to accidents occurring before this date. It will be interesting to see whether any of these older cases will have any bearing on the interpretation of the new fencing provision in regulation 11 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998. Since the new provisions include requirements ‘to prevent access to any dangerous part of machinery’, it is arguable that the old authorities will remain of relevance. Interestingly, a successful claim has now been brought against an employer for breach of regulation 6(1) of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992 (now regulation 5(1) of the Regulations as re-issued in 1998). This regulation stipulates that ‘every employer shall ensure that work equipment is maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and in good repair’. In Stark v The Post Office (2000) the claimant appealed against a decision of the High Court dismissing his claim for damages on the ground that the defendant employer was neither liable in negligence nor for breach of statutory duty. The claimant suffered serious personal injury when the front brake broke on the bicycle he was riding when delivering mail. The judge’s unchallenged finding of fact was that the cause of the brake failure was either