required the hirer to accept the risks. If, therefore, the hirer rather than the owner of the crane were the insured, the party who took out the cover was not liable and the party who was liable would not have been insured. The House of Lords found that the organisations could not through their contractual arrangements determine the legal question of who was the employer: they could have agreed that in cases where the (general) employer was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence the other organisation would indemnify the employer. It has been noted that an organisation may face either employer’s liability or public liability. The former Workmen’s Compensation Acts did not impose a statutory duty on employers to insure against liabilities arising from that legislation. Wiser employers did take out insurance cover. While an employer is now required by the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 to have insurance to cover injuries suffered by its employees, there is still no similar obligation to have public liability insurance. The expectation that the employer will have funds to meet liability has tended to encourage litigation against employers. DAVIE v NEW MERTON BOARD MILLS AND ANOTHER [1959] AC 604 This was an appeal to the House of Lords by a maintenance fitter, employed by the first defendant, injured while attempting to separate two metal parts by using a drift (that is a tapered bar of metal intended for this purpose) and a hammer. When he struck the drift with the hammer the drift broke and a piece entered the appellant’s eye. The victim sued his employers, and at a later stage the manufacturers of the drift were joined as defendants. At the trial it emerged that the fault in the drift had been entirely due to the negligence of the manufacturer. There had been no personal negligence on the part of the employers in purchasing or maintaining the drift. If liability were attached to the employers they would, in effect, have been made vicariously liable for the negligence of the manufacturers of the tool. The House of Lords declined to impose such liability, holding that the employers had discharged their personal duty to take reasonable care by buying from a reputable source a tool whose latent defect they had no means of discovering. The following extract from the judgment of Viscount Simonds, beginning at p 624, indicates the reasoning of their Lordships:

doi:10.4324/9781843140504-71

Chapter

required the hirer to accept the risks. If, therefore, the hirer rather than the owner of the crane were the insured, the party who took out the cover was not liable and the party who was liable would not have been insured. The House of Lords found that the organisations could not through their contractual arrangements determine the legal question of who was the employer: they could have agreed that in cases where the (general) employer was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence the other organisation would indemnify the employer. It has been noted that an organisation may face either employer’s liability or public liability. The former Workmen’s Compensation Acts did not impose a statutory duty on employers to insure against liabilities arising from that legislation. Wiser employers did take out insurance cover. While an employer is now required by the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 to have insurance to cover injuries suffered by its employees, there is still no similar obligation to have public liability insurance. The expectation that the employer will have funds to meet liability has tended to encourage litigation against employers. DAVIE v NEW MERTON BOARD MILLS AND ANOTHER [1959] AC 604 This was an appeal to the House of Lords by a maintenance fitter, employed by the first defendant, injured while attempting to separate two metal parts by using a drift (that is a tapered bar of metal intended for this purpose) and a hammer. When he struck the drift with the hammer the drift broke and a piece entered the appellant’s eye. The victim sued his employers, and at a later stage the manufacturers of the drift were joined as defendants. At the trial it emerged that the fault in the drift had been entirely due to the negligence of the manufacturer. There had been no personal negligence on the part of the employers in purchasing or maintaining the drift. If liability were attached to the employers they would, in effect, have been made vicariously liable for the negligence of the manufacturers of the tool. The House of Lords declined to impose such liability, holding that the employers had discharged their personal duty to take reasonable care by buying from a reputable source a tool whose latent defect they had no means of discovering. The following extract from the judgment of Viscount Simonds, beginning at p 624, indicates the reasoning of their Lordships:

Chapter

required the hirer to accept the risks. If, therefore, the hirer rather than the owner of the crane were the insured, the party who took out the cover was not liable and the party who was liable would not have been insured. The House of Lords found that the organisations could not through their contractual arrangements determine the legal question of who was the employer: they could have agreed that in cases where the (general) employer was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence the other organisation would indemnify the employer. It has been noted that an organisation may face either employer’s liability or public liability. The former Workmen’s Compensation Acts did not impose a statutory duty on employers to insure against liabilities arising from that legislation. Wiser employers did take out insurance cover. While an employer is now required by the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 to have insurance to cover injuries suffered by its employees, there is still no similar obligation to have public liability insurance. The expectation that the employer will have funds to meet liability has tended to encourage litigation against employers. DAVIE v NEW MERTON BOARD MILLS AND ANOTHER [1959] AC 604 This was an appeal to the House of Lords by a maintenance fitter, employed by the first defendant, injured while attempting to separate two metal parts by using a drift (that is a tapered bar of metal intended for this purpose) and a hammer. When he struck the drift with the hammer the drift broke and a piece entered the appellant’s eye. The victim sued his employers, and at a later stage the manufacturers of the drift were joined as defendants. At the trial it emerged that the fault in the drift had been entirely due to the negligence of the manufacturer. There had been no personal negligence on the part of the employers in purchasing or maintaining the drift. If liability were attached to the employers they would, in effect, have been made vicariously liable for the negligence of the manufacturers of the tool. The House of Lords declined to impose such liability, holding that the employers had discharged their personal duty to take reasonable care by buying from a reputable source a tool whose latent defect they had no means of discovering. The following extract from the judgment of Viscount Simonds, beginning at p 624, indicates the reasoning of their Lordships:

DOI link for required the hirer to accept the risks. If, therefore, the hirer rather than the owner of the crane were the insured, the party who took out the cover was not liable and the party who was liable would not have been insured. The House of Lords found that the organisations could not through their contractual arrangements determine the legal question of who was the employer: they could have agreed that in cases where the (general) employer was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence the other organisation would indemnify the employer. It has been noted that an organisation may face either employer’s liability or public liability. The former Workmen’s Compensation Acts did not impose a statutory duty on employers to insure against liabilities arising from that legislation. Wiser employers did take out insurance cover. While an employer is now required by the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 to have insurance to cover injuries suffered by its employees, there is still no similar obligation to have public liability insurance. The expectation that the employer will have funds to meet liability has tended to encourage litigation against employers. DAVIE v NEW MERTON BOARD MILLS AND ANOTHER [1959] AC 604 This was an appeal to the House of Lords by a maintenance fitter, employed by the first defendant, injured while attempting to separate two metal parts by using a drift (that is a tapered bar of metal intended for this purpose) and a hammer. When he struck the drift with the hammer the drift broke and a piece entered the appellant’s eye. The victim sued his employers, and at a later stage the manufacturers of the drift were joined as defendants. At the trial it emerged that the fault in the drift had been entirely due to the negligence of the manufacturer. There had been no personal negligence on the part of the employers in purchasing or maintaining the drift. If liability were attached to the employers they would, in effect, have been made vicariously liable for the negligence of the manufacturers of the tool. The House of Lords declined to impose such liability, holding that the employers had discharged their personal duty to take reasonable care by buying from a reputable source a tool whose latent defect they had no means of discovering. The following extract from the judgment of Viscount Simonds, beginning at p 624, indicates the reasoning of their Lordships:

required the hirer to accept the risks. If, therefore, the hirer rather than the owner of the crane were the insured, the party who took out the cover was not liable and the party who was liable would not have been insured. The House of Lords found that the organisations could not through their contractual arrangements determine the legal question of who was the employer: they could have agreed that in cases where the (general) employer was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence the other organisation would indemnify the employer. It has been noted that an organisation may face either employer’s liability or public liability. The former Workmen’s Compensation Acts did not impose a statutory duty on employers to insure against liabilities arising from that legislation. Wiser employers did take out insurance cover. While an employer is now required by the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 to have insurance to cover injuries suffered by its employees, there is still no similar obligation to have public liability insurance. The expectation that the employer will have funds to meet liability has tended to encourage litigation against employers. DAVIE v NEW MERTON BOARD MILLS AND ANOTHER [1959] AC 604 This was an appeal to the House of Lords by a maintenance fitter, employed by the first defendant, injured while attempting to separate two metal parts by using a drift (that is a tapered bar of metal intended for this purpose) and a hammer. When he struck the drift with the hammer the drift broke and a piece entered the appellant’s eye. The victim sued his employers, and at a later stage the manufacturers of the drift were joined as defendants. At the trial it emerged that the fault in the drift had been entirely due to the negligence of the manufacturer. There had been no personal negligence on the part of the employers in purchasing or maintaining the drift. If liability were attached to the employers they would, in effect, have been made vicariously liable for the negligence of the manufacturers of the tool. The House of Lords declined to impose such liability, holding that the employers had discharged their personal duty to take reasonable care by buying from a reputable source a tool whose latent defect they had no means of discovering. The following extract from the judgment of Viscount Simonds, beginning at p 624, indicates the reasoning of their Lordships:

ABSTRACT

I turn, then, to Lord Maugham23 ... As I have tried to show, the contention, as stated in its first form, that the employer is liable for the acts of himself, his servants and agents and, subject to whatever limitations might be thought fit, independent contractors, could not lead to success in this action: for the manufacturer could not by any legitimate use of language be considered the

servant or agent of, or an independent contractor with, the employer who buys his manufactures in the market. It was then sought to reach the same result by a different road. The employer, it was said, was under a duty to take reasonable care to supply his workmen with proper plant and machinery. It was assumed that this included tools such as drifts, and I, too, will, without deciding it, assume it. It was then said that the employer could not escape responsibility by employing a third party, however expert, to do his duty for him. So far, so good. That is what Lord Maugham said and I agree. But then comes the next step – but I would rather call it a jump, and a jump that would unhorse any rider. Therefore, it was said, the employer is responsible for the defect in goods that he buys in the market, if it can be shown that the defect was due to the want of skill or care on the part of anyone who was concerned in its manufacture. But, my Lords, by what use or misuse of language can the manufacturer be said to be a person to whom the employer delegated a duty which it was for him to perform? How can it be said that it was as the delegate or agent of the employer that the manufacturer failed to exhibit due skill and care? It is, to my mind, clear that he cannot and equally clear that Lord Maugham was not contemplating such a case nor using language which was apt to cover it.