here, because their Lordships distinguished between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ victims. Primary victims were participants. That is, persons present at the catastrophe and at risk of personal injury. Secondary victims were persons, who were either mere bystanders (with no entitlement to compensation) or those who witnessed the suffering of their loved ones, being physically present, either at the time and place of the disaster or seeing their loved ones in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. Their Lordships suggested that rescuers might be classified as ‘primary’ victims, even if not at risk of personal injury. Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police has been interpreted restrictively, as the following cases demonstrate. Claimant was neither at personal risk nor a rescuer MCFARLANE v EE CALEDONIA [1994] 2 ALL ER 1 The principal judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered by Stuart-Smith LJ. It is largely concerned with identifying the facts. These may be summarised as follows. The case concerned the catastrophe on the oil platform Piper Alpha, on 6 July 1988, in which 164 persons lost their lives and many more were seriously injured. One of the vessels which went to assist was the Tharos. At the time that the emergency arose, the claimant was in bed on board the Tharos, but he got up and went out on to the walkway; from this position he witnessed a rescue boat engulfed in a fireball, killing its occupants.He also saw men jumping from the platform to their death. He was at no time nearer than 100 metres to the platform. No one on the Tharos suffered any physical injury that night and the vessel itself was undamaged, apart from some blistering of paint. He claimed that, as a result of his experiences that night, he suffered psychiatric injury. The matter came before Mrs Justice Smith on a preliminary issue as to whether the defendants, who were the owners and operators of the Piper Alpha, owed the plaintiff a duty of care to avoid causing him psychiatric injury. She found that the claimant had been a participant in the events; he had been in fear of his life and it was plainly foreseeable that a man of reasonable fortitude might suffer psychiatric injury if exposed to the shock of being in fear of his life; findings which resulted in her giving judgment for the claimant. The defendants appealed against her judgment. On appeal, Stuart-Smith LJ found that there were three situations in which a person might be a participant when he suffered psychiatric injury: first, where he was in the actual area of danger, but escaped physical injury by chance or good fortune; secondly, where the claimant was not actually in danger but, because of the sudden and unexpected nature of the event he

DOI link for here, because their Lordships distinguished between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ victims. Primary victims were participants. That is, persons present at the catastrophe and at risk of personal injury. Secondary victims were persons, who were either mere bystanders (with no entitlement to compensation) or those who witnessed the suffering of their loved ones, being physically present, either at the time and place of the disaster or seeing their loved ones in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. Their Lordships suggested that rescuers might be classified as ‘primary’ victims, even if not at risk of personal injury. Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police has been interpreted restrictively, as the following cases demonstrate. Claimant was neither at personal risk nor a rescuer MCFARLANE v EE CALEDONIA [1994] 2 ALL ER 1 The principal judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered by Stuart-Smith LJ. It is largely concerned with identifying the facts. These may be summarised as follows. The case concerned the catastrophe on the oil platform Piper Alpha, on 6 July 1988, in which 164 persons lost their lives and many more were seriously injured. One of the vessels which went to assist was the Tharos. At the time that the emergency arose, the claimant was in bed on board the Tharos, but he got up and went out on to the walkway; from this position he witnessed a rescue boat engulfed in a fireball, killing its occupants.He also saw men jumping from the platform to their death. He was at no time nearer than 100 metres to the platform. No one on the Tharos suffered any physical injury that night and the vessel itself was undamaged, apart from some blistering of paint. He claimed that, as a result of his experiences that night, he suffered psychiatric injury. The matter came before Mrs Justice Smith on a preliminary issue as to whether the defendants, who were the owners and operators of the Piper Alpha, owed the plaintiff a duty of care to avoid causing him psychiatric injury. She found that the claimant had been a participant in the events; he had been in fear of his life and it was plainly foreseeable that a man of reasonable fortitude might suffer psychiatric injury if exposed to the shock of being in fear of his life; findings which resulted in her giving judgment for the claimant. The defendants appealed against her judgment. On appeal, Stuart-Smith LJ found that there were three situations in which a person might be a participant when he suffered psychiatric injury: first, where he was in the actual area of danger, but escaped physical injury by chance or good fortune; secondly, where the claimant was not actually in danger but, because of the sudden and unexpected nature of the event he

here, because their Lordships distinguished between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ victims. Primary victims were participants. That is, persons present at the catastrophe and at risk of personal injury. Secondary victims were persons, who were either mere bystanders (with no entitlement to compensation) or those who witnessed the suffering of their loved ones, being physically present, either at the time and place of the disaster or seeing their loved ones in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. Their Lordships suggested that rescuers might be classified as ‘primary’ victims, even if not at risk of personal injury. Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police has been interpreted restrictively, as the following cases demonstrate. Claimant was neither at personal risk nor a rescuer MCFARLANE v EE CALEDONIA [1994] 2 ALL ER 1 The principal judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered by Stuart-Smith LJ. It is largely concerned with identifying the facts. These may be summarised as follows. The case concerned the catastrophe on the oil platform Piper Alpha, on 6 July 1988, in which 164 persons lost their lives and many more were seriously injured. One of the vessels which went to assist was the Tharos. At the time that the emergency arose, the claimant was in bed on board the Tharos, but he got up and went out on to the walkway; from this position he witnessed a rescue boat engulfed in a fireball, killing its occupants.He also saw men jumping from the platform to their death. He was at no time nearer than 100 metres to the platform. No one on the Tharos suffered any physical injury that night and the vessel itself was undamaged, apart from some blistering of paint. He claimed that, as a result of his experiences that night, he suffered psychiatric injury. The matter came before Mrs Justice Smith on a preliminary issue as to whether the defendants, who were the owners and operators of the Piper Alpha, owed the plaintiff a duty of care to avoid causing him psychiatric injury. She found that the claimant had been a participant in the events; he had been in fear of his life and it was plainly foreseeable that a man of reasonable fortitude might suffer psychiatric injury if exposed to the shock of being in fear of his life; findings which resulted in her giving judgment for the claimant. The defendants appealed against her judgment. On appeal, Stuart-Smith LJ found that there were three situations in which a person might be a participant when he suffered psychiatric injury: first, where he was in the actual area of danger, but escaped physical injury by chance or good fortune; secondly, where the claimant was not actually in danger but, because of the sudden and unexpected nature of the event he