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of their duty simply by failing to answer questions, nor can the judge or prosecutor suggest to the jury that such silence is evidence of guilt. In the appellant was seen by officers in the early hours of the morning behaving suspiciously in an area where house breaking had taken place on the same evening. On being questioned, he refused to say where he was going, or where he had come from. He refused to give his full name and address, though he did give a name and the name of a road which were not untrue. He refused to accompany the officer to a police box for identification purposes saying, 'If you want me you'll have to arrest me'. He was arrested and charged with wilfully obstructing a police officer contrary to s 51(3) of the Police Act 1964. His appeal against conviction succeeded. Lord Parker noted that the police officer was acting within his duty in inquiring about the appellant and that what the appellant did was obstructive. The critical question, though, was whether the appellant's conduct was 'wilful' within the meaning of s 51. Lord Parker CJ, in the Divisional Court, took that word to mean 'intentional [and] without lawful excuse'. He continued:
DOI link for of their duty simply by failing to answer questions, nor can the judge or prosecutor suggest to the jury that such silence is evidence of guilt. In the appellant was seen by officers in the early hours of the morning behaving suspiciously in an area where house breaking had taken place on the same evening. On being questioned, he refused to say where he was going, or where he had come from. He refused to give his full name and address, though he did give a name and the name of a road which were not untrue. He refused to accompany the officer to a police box for identification purposes saying, 'If you want me you'll have to arrest me'. He was arrested and charged with wilfully obstructing a police officer contrary to s 51(3) of the Police Act 1964. His appeal against conviction succeeded. Lord Parker noted that the police officer was acting within his duty in inquiring about the appellant and that what the appellant did was obstructive. The critical question, though, was whether the appellant's conduct was 'wilful' within the meaning of s 51. Lord Parker CJ, in the Divisional Court, took that word to mean 'intentional [and] without lawful excuse'. He continued:
of their duty simply by failing to answer questions, nor can the judge or prosecutor suggest to the jury that such silence is evidence of guilt. In the appellant was seen by officers in the early hours of the morning behaving suspiciously in an area where house breaking had taken place on the same evening. On being questioned, he refused to say where he was going, or where he had come from. He refused to give his full name and address, though he did give a name and the name of a road which were not untrue. He refused to accompany the officer to a police box for identification purposes saying, 'If you want me you'll have to arrest me'. He was arrested and charged with wilfully obstructing a police officer contrary to s 51(3) of the Police Act 1964. His appeal against conviction succeeded. Lord Parker noted that the police officer was acting within his duty in inquiring about the appellant and that what the appellant did was obstructive. The critical question, though, was whether the appellant's conduct was 'wilful' within the meaning of s 51. Lord Parker CJ, in the Divisional Court, took that word to mean 'intentional [and] without lawful excuse'. He continued:
ABSTRACT
It seems to me quite clear that though every citizen has a moral duty or, if you like, a social duty to assist the police, there is no legal duty to that effect, and indeed the whole basis of the common law is the right of the individual to refuse to answer questions put to him by persons in authority, and to refuse to accompany those in authority to any particular place; short, of course, of arrest.