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![a collateral attack is to win in the civil case, proving negligence against the criminal trial lawyer and, thus, by implication, show that the conviction in the criminal case was unfair. Findings Held: the House of Lords held (Lord Hope, Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse dissenting in part) that, in the light of modern conditions, it was now clear that it was no longer in the public interest in the administration of justice that advocates should have immunity from suit for negligence for acts concerned with the conduct of either civil or criminal litigation. Lord Hoffmann (with Lord Steyn, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Millett delivering concurring opinions) said that over 30 years had passed since the House had last considered the rationale for the immunity of the advocate from suit, in Randel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191. Public policy was not immutable and there had been great changes in the law of negligence, the functioning of the legal profession, the administration of justice and public perceptions. It was once again time to re-examine the whole matter. Interestingly, Lord Hoffmann chose to formulate his opinion in a creative mode to reflect public policy rather than in the tradition of what can be seen as slavish obedience to the details of precedent: if](https://images.tandf.co.uk/common/jackets/crclarge/978185941/9781859415535.jpg "a collateral attack is to win in the civil case, proving negligence against the criminal trial lawyer and, thus, by implication, show that the conviction in the criminal case was unfair. Findings Held: the House of Lords held (Lord Hope, Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse dissenting in part) that, in the light of modern conditions, it was now clear that it was no longer in the public interest in the administration of justice that advocates should have immunity from suit for negligence for acts concerned with the conduct of either civil or criminal litigation. Lord Hoffmann (with Lord Steyn, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Millett delivering concurring opinions) said that over 30 years had passed since the House had last considered the rationale for the immunity of the advocate from suit, in Randel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191. Public policy was not immutable and there had been great changes in the law of negligence, the functioning of the legal profession, the administration of justice and public perceptions. It was once again time to re-examine the whole matter. Interestingly, Lord Hoffmann chose to formulate his opinion in a creative mode to reflect public policy rather than in the tradition of what can be seen as slavish obedience to the details of precedent: if")
Chapter
a collateral attack is to win in the civil case, proving negligence against the criminal trial lawyer and, thus, by implication, show that the conviction in the criminal case was unfair. Findings Held: the House of Lords held (Lord Hope, Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse dissenting in part) that, in the light of modern conditions, it was now clear that it was no longer in the public interest in the administration of justice that advocates should have immunity from suit for negligence for acts concerned with the conduct of either civil or criminal litigation. Lord Hoffmann (with Lord Steyn, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Millett delivering concurring opinions) said that over 30 years had passed since the House had last considered the rationale for the immunity of the advocate from suit, in Randel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191. Public policy was not immutable and there had been great changes in the law of negligence, the functioning of the legal profession, the administration of justice and public perceptions. It was once again time to re-examine the whole matter. Interestingly, Lord Hoffmann chose to formulate his opinion in a creative mode to reflect public policy rather than in the tradition of what can be seen as slavish obedience to the details of precedent: if
DOI link for a collateral attack is to win in the civil case, proving negligence against the criminal trial lawyer and, thus, by implication, show that the conviction in the criminal case was unfair. Findings Held: the House of Lords held (Lord Hope, Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse dissenting in part) that, in the light of modern conditions, it was now clear that it was no longer in the public interest in the administration of justice that advocates should have immunity from suit for negligence for acts concerned with the conduct of either civil or criminal litigation. Lord Hoffmann (with Lord Steyn, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Millett delivering concurring opinions) said that over 30 years had passed since the House had last considered the rationale for the immunity of the advocate from suit, in Randel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191. Public policy was not immutable and there had been great changes in the law of negligence, the functioning of the legal profession, the administration of justice and public perceptions. It was once again time to re-examine the whole matter. Interestingly, Lord Hoffmann chose to formulate his opinion in a creative mode to reflect public policy rather than in the tradition of what can be seen as slavish obedience to the details of precedent: if
a collateral attack is to win in the civil case, proving negligence against the criminal trial lawyer and, thus, by implication, show that the conviction in the criminal case was unfair. Findings Held: the House of Lords held (Lord Hope, Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse dissenting in part) that, in the light of modern conditions, it was now clear that it was no longer in the public interest in the administration of justice that advocates should have immunity from suit for negligence for acts concerned with the conduct of either civil or criminal litigation. Lord Hoffmann (with Lord Steyn, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Millett delivering concurring opinions) said that over 30 years had passed since the House had last considered the rationale for the immunity of the advocate from suit, in Randel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191. Public policy was not immutable and there had been great changes in the law of negligence, the functioning of the legal profession, the administration of justice and public perceptions. It was once again time to re-examine the whole matter. Interestingly, Lord Hoffmann chose to formulate his opinion in a creative mode to reflect public policy rather than in the tradition of what can be seen as slavish obedience to the details of precedent: if
ABSTRACT
I hope that I will not be thought ungrateful if I do not encumber this speech with citations. The question of what the public interest now requires depends upon the strength of the arguments rather than the weight of authority.
