referred to in court until he started shouting in court after the appellant had been convicted and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. The appellant appealed on the ground that, applying the test of whether a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in the court and knowing all the relevant facts would have had a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial of the appellant had not been possible, the presence of the juror on the jury constituted a serious irregularity in the conduct of the trial. The Court of Appeal held that the proper test for determining whether a conviction obtained on a trial on indictment should be quashed on the grounds of possible bias on the part of a juror was whether there was a real danger that the accused might not have had a fair trial and not whether a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in court and knowing all the relevant facts would have had a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial of the defendant had not been possible. The court held that, applying that test, the circumstances of the case were such that there was no danger that the appellant might not have had a fair trial, and it dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed to the House of Lords.

doi:10.4324/9781843143451-148

Chapter

referred to in court until he started shouting in court after the appellant had been convicted and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. The appellant appealed on the ground that, applying the test of whether a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in the court and knowing all the relevant facts would have had a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial of the appellant had not been possible, the presence of the juror on the jury constituted a serious irregularity in the conduct of the trial. The Court of Appeal held that the proper test for determining whether a conviction obtained on a trial on indictment should be quashed on the grounds of possible bias on the part of a juror was whether there was a real danger that the accused might not have had a fair trial and not whether a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in court and knowing all the relevant facts would have had a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial of the defendant had not been possible. The court held that, applying that test, the circumstances of the case were such that there was no danger that the appellant might not have had a fair trial, and it dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed to the House of Lords.

Chapter

referred to in court until he started shouting in court after the appellant had been convicted and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. The appellant appealed on the ground that, applying the test of whether a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in the court and knowing all the relevant facts would have had a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial of the appellant had not been possible, the presence of the juror on the jury constituted a serious irregularity in the conduct of the trial. The Court of Appeal held that the proper test for determining whether a conviction obtained on a trial on indictment should be quashed on the grounds of possible bias on the part of a juror was whether there was a real danger that the accused might not have had a fair trial and not whether a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in court and knowing all the relevant facts would have had a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial of the defendant had not been possible. The court held that, applying that test, the circumstances of the case were such that there was no danger that the appellant might not have had a fair trial, and it dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed to the House of Lords.

ABSTRACT

Lord Goff of Chieveley: ... The Court of Appeal identified ... two strands of authority, revealing that differing criteria have been applied in the past when considering the question of bias. The two tests have, as will appear, themselves been variously described. The Court of Appeal identified them as being (1) whether there was a real danger of bias on the part of the person concerned or (2) whether a reasonable person might reasonably suspect bias on his part. In the end, the court concluded that the former test was to be applied in cases concerned with jurors, and the latter in those concerned with magistrates or other inferior tribunals. The court therefore applied the real danger test in the present case and, on that basis, held that the appeal must fail, as indeed had been accepted by counsel for the appellant... A layman might well wonder why the function of a court in cases such as these should not simply be to conduct an inquiry into the question whether the tribunal was in fact biased. After all it is alleged that, for example, a justice or a juryman was biased, ie that he was motivated by a desire unfairly to favour one side or to disfavour the other. Why does the court not simply decide whether that was in fact the case? The answer, as always, is that it is more complicated than that. First of all, there are difficulties about exploring the actual state of mind of a justice or juryman. In the case of both, such an inquiry has been thought to be undesirable; and, in the case of the juryman in particular, there has long been an inhibition against, so to speak, entering the jury room and finding out what any particular juryman actually thought at the time of decision. But there is also the simple fact that bias is such an insidious thing that, even though a person may in good faith believe that he was acting impartially, his mind may unconsciously be affected by bias ...