possibility is that the ship might be released at a fairly early stage, with the result that it can be returned to the charterer so that the residue of the charter period may be satisfied. Conversely, the war may be longer lasting than was anticipated at the outset, with the result that there is no value to the charterer when the ship is returned to him. Essentially, when a contract is frustrated is a matter of fact, and an appellate court is unlikely to interfere with the trial judge’s or arbitrator’s decision: Kodros Shipping Corpn v Empresa Cubana De Flotes, The Evia (No 2) [1983] 1 AC 736, HL, p 767

My Lords, attempts were made to review this choice of date by reference to dates chosen by other distinguished arbitrators or umpires in other cases said to raise the same issue. Two other arbitrators, or umpires, were said to have chosen 24 November 1980. This date is some seven weeks later than the date chosen by Mr Eckersley. Your Lordships were invited to study the reasons for those other awards which were included with your Lordships’ papers and your Lordships declined to do so. My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships were entirely right to adopt that attitude, for it must be wrong in principle to consider other awards arising from different questions of fact. In preparing this speech I have not referred to either of those two awards. Lord Denning MR said that it was desirable for the same result to be reached in similar cases. No doubt in a perfect world that would be right. But in an imperfect world different opinions can be legitimately formed on matters of this kind. The learned Master of the Rolls in his judgment referred to what I had said in The Nema [1982] AC 724 with the agreement of all my noble and learned friends then sitting, including my noble and learned friend, Lord Diplock, namely, that where questions of degree are involved opinions may, and often do, legitimately differ. I am not in the least surprised at this difference of opinion. The charterparties in question may well have been of differing characteristics and of different lengths. The discharge of cargo may have been completed on a different date. The several masters, officers and crew may have left their ships on different dates. A host of differing factors may have arisen, and in common with all your Lordships I resolutely decline to investigate the facts found in other cases to see which choice of date is to be preferred. The choice of date in this case, as in the others, was for the umpire or arbitrator concerned and is not a matter for your Lordships’ House. I would dismiss this appeal.