seriousness of the breach. On the other analysis, the cases demonstrated a rule of substantive law (not merely a rule of construction) that it was impossible for any clause (however widely drafted) to exclude liability for breaches which were ‘fundamental’. Support can be found in the earlier cases for both approaches – with the ‘rule of law’ approach particularly prominent in the judgments of Lord Denning. A good example of this was Karsales (Harrow) Ltd v Wallis where a secondhand Buick car was delivered to Wallis in an appalling condition (it lacked a cylinder head, valves in the engine had been burned out and two of the pistons had been broken). Indeed, it was incapable of self-propulsion and had been towed to Wallis’ premises. In an action by Karsales against Wallis for arrears, they relied on cl 3(9), which stated that ‘No condition or warranty that the vehicle is roadworthy or as to its age, condition or fitness for purpose is given by the owner, or implied herein’. The almost astounding decision

DOI link for seriousness of the breach. On the other analysis, the cases demonstrated a rule of substantive law (not merely a rule of construction) that it was impossible for any clause (however widely drafted) to exclude liability for breaches which were ‘fundamental’. Support can be found in the earlier cases for both approaches – with the ‘rule of law’ approach particularly prominent in the judgments of Lord Denning. A good example of this was Karsales (Harrow) Ltd v Wallis where a secondhand Buick car was delivered to Wallis in an appalling condition (it lacked a cylinder head, valves in the engine had been burned out and two of the pistons had been broken). Indeed, it was incapable of self-propulsion and had been towed to Wallis’ premises. In an action by Karsales against Wallis for arrears, they relied on cl 3(9), which stated that ‘No condition or warranty that the vehicle is roadworthy or as to its age, condition or fitness for purpose is given by the owner, or implied herein’. The almost astounding decision

seriousness of the breach. On the other analysis, the cases demonstrated a rule of substantive law (not merely a rule of construction) that it was impossible for any clause (however widely drafted) to exclude liability for breaches which were ‘fundamental’. Support can be found in the earlier cases for both approaches – with the ‘rule of law’ approach particularly prominent in the judgments of Lord Denning. A good example of this was Karsales (Harrow) Ltd v Wallis where a secondhand Buick car was delivered to Wallis in an appalling condition (it lacked a cylinder head, valves in the engine had been burned out and two of the pistons had been broken). Indeed, it was incapable of self-propulsion and had been towed to Wallis’ premises. In an action by Karsales against Wallis for arrears, they relied on cl 3(9), which stated that ‘No condition or warranty that the vehicle is roadworthy or as to its age, condition or fitness for purpose is given by the owner, or implied herein’. The almost astounding decision