trustee for such persons, and that such persons should be deemed to be parties to the contract. The Privy Council unanimously agreed that an appropriately worded clause could protect a third party and a majority held that this clause did serve to protect the stevedores. The court was prepared to treat the presentation of the bill of lading by the consignee as a unilateral offer of exemption which was capable of creating mutual obligations when the stevedores performed services for the benefit of the consignee by discharging the goods: New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v AM Satterthwaite & Co Ltd [1975] AC 154, p 166

Lord Wilberforce: The question in the appeal is whether the stevedore can take the benefit of the time limitation provision. The starting point, in discussion of this question, is provided by the House of Lords decision in Midland Silicones Ltd v Scruttons Ltd [1962] AC 446. There is no need to question or even to qualify that case in so far as it affirms the general proposition that a contract between two parties cannot be sued on by a third person, even though the contract is expressed to be for his benefit. Nor is it necessary to disagree with anything which was said to the same effect in the Australian case of Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 43. Each of these cases was dealing with a simple case of a contract the benefit of which was sought to be taken by a third person not a party to it, and the emphatic pronouncements in the speeches and judgments were directed to this situation. But Midland Silicones left open the case where one of the parties contracts as agent for the third person: in particular, Lord Reid’s speech spelt out, in four propositions, the pre-requisites for the validity of such an agency contract. There is, of course, nothing unique to this case in the conception of agency contracts: well known and common instances exist in the field of hire purchase, of bankers’ commercial credits and other transactions. Lord Reid said, at p 474: ‘I can see a possibility of success of the agency argument if (first) the bill of lading makes it clear that the stevedore is intended to be protected by the provisions in it which limit liability, (secondly) the bill of lading makes it clear that the carrier, in addition to contracting for these provisions on his own behalf, is also contracting as agent for the stevedore that these provisions should apply to the stevedore, (thirdly) the carrier has authority from the stevedore to do that, or perhaps later ratification by the stevedore would suffice, and (fourthly) that any difficulties about consideration moving from the stevedore were overcome. And then to affect the consignee it would be necessary to show that the provisions of the Bills of Lading Act 1855 apply.’