In Goldsworthy v Brickell, the plaintiff, an 85 year old widower, who owned a farm worth about £1 million, had come to trust and rely upon his neighbour, the defendant, for help in running his farm. Despite the fact that there was no evidence of actual undue pressure, the relationship was regarded as one to which the presumption of undue influence could apply, with the result that an agreement under which the defendant rented the farm from the plaintiff at a very low rent, coupled with a favourable option to purchase, could be set aside: Goldsworthy v Brickell [1987] Ch 378, p 400

doi:10.4324/9781843141518-170

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In Goldsworthy v Brickell, the plaintiff, an 85 year old widower, who owned a farm worth about £1 million, had come to trust and rely upon his neighbour, the defendant, for help in running his farm. Despite the fact that there was no evidence of actual undue pressure, the relationship was regarded as one to which the presumption of undue influence could apply, with the result that an agreement under which the defendant rented the farm from the plaintiff at a very low rent, coupled with a favourable option to purchase, could be set aside: Goldsworthy v Brickell [1987] Ch 378, p 400

ABSTRACT

Goldsworthy v Brickell [1987] Ch 378, p 400 Nourse LJ: I now come to the question of undue influence. On this question, the argument of Mr Pryor for the defendant was mainly founded on four propositions. First, since the plaintiff’s case has throughout been one of dishonest persuasion, it can only succeed if there is proved to have been some form of dishonesty or conscious abuse of power by the defendant. Secondly, the plaintiff must prove a relationship which can properly be described as one of domination of the plaintiff by the defendant. Thirdly, the judge’s findings as to the situation, physical and mental condition, character and disposition of the plaintiff in 1976-77 are wholly inconsistent with the existence of such a relationship. Fourthly, the transaction effected by the tenancy and partnership agreements was not manifestly and unfairly disadvantageous to the plaintiff. The fourth of these propositions stands on its own and can be treated separately. The first three run more or less together and, since they have proceeded on some notable misconceptions as to the circumstances in which courts of equity have set aside transactions on the ground of undue influence, require those circumstances to be restated.