the main contract may still be cancelled or varied without the consent of T, if the contract expressly so provides. In these circumstances, if the contract makes such express provision, it will make no difference whether T consents to the variation or cancellation and it will be irrelevant that T has in fact relied on the promise to confer a benefit upon him. Moreover, by virtue of s2(3)(b), an express term of the main contract may also require the consent of T in any circumstance other than those specified in s2(1). For example, it would be open to the contracting parties to specify the form in which the consent is to be given, in which case, T’s consent would be ineffective unless given in the form specified by A and B. In certain circumstances, the court has a discretion to dispense with the requirement of consent. Under s2(4), the court may, on an application by A and B, order that T’s consent is not necessary. The first of these is where T cannot be found and the second where T is mentally incapable of giving consent. Likewise, under s2(5), the requirement of T’s consent may be waived where it cannot reasonably be ascertained whether T has, in fact, relied on the terms in the contract between A and B. In these circumstances, the court has a power to award compensation to T. The 1999 Act provides for a number of defences to an action brought by a third party. Under s3(2), where T seeks to enforce a term expressed to be for his benefit against the promisor (A), A may rely, by way of defence or set off, on ‘any matter that arises from or in connection with the contract and is relevant to the term’. For these purposes, the relevant defence must be one which would have been available to A in proceedings brought by the promisee (B). Thus, A would be able to rely on any exemption clause in the main contract or would be able to pursue relief in respect of an actionable mistake or misrepresentation. The general rule established by s3(2) can be displaced by an express provision in the contract between A and B. Thus, it would be open to the parties to the main contract to narrow or widen the defences or set offs available to A or to exclude the availability of such defences altogether. The Act also envisages the possibility that there may be

DOI link for the main contract may still be cancelled or varied without the consent of T, if the contract expressly so provides. In these circumstances, if the contract makes such express provision, it will make no difference whether T consents to the variation or cancellation and it will be irrelevant that T has in fact relied on the promise to confer a benefit upon him. Moreover, by virtue of s2(3)(b), an express term of the main contract may also require the consent of T in any circumstance other than those specified in s2(1). For example, it would be open to the contracting parties to specify the form in which the consent is to be given, in which case, T’s consent would be ineffective unless given in the form specified by A and B. In certain circumstances, the court has a discretion to dispense with the requirement of consent. Under s2(4), the court may, on an application by A and B, order that T’s consent is not necessary. The first of these is where T cannot be found and the second where T is mentally incapable of giving consent. Likewise, under s2(5), the requirement of T’s consent may be waived where it cannot reasonably be ascertained whether T has, in fact, relied on the terms in the contract between A and B. In these circumstances, the court has a power to award compensation to T. The 1999 Act provides for a number of defences to an action brought by a third party. Under s3(2), where T seeks to enforce a term expressed to be for his benefit against the promisor (A), A may rely, by way of defence or set off, on ‘any matter that arises from or in connection with the contract and is relevant to the term’. For these purposes, the relevant defence must be one which would have been available to A in proceedings brought by the promisee (B). Thus, A would be able to rely on any exemption clause in the main contract or would be able to pursue relief in respect of an actionable mistake or misrepresentation. The general rule established by s3(2) can be displaced by an express provision in the contract between A and B. Thus, it would be open to the parties to the main contract to narrow or widen the defences or set offs available to A or to exclude the availability of such defences altogether. The Act also envisages the possibility that there may be

the main contract may still be cancelled or varied without the consent of T, if the contract expressly so provides. In these circumstances, if the contract makes such express provision, it will make no difference whether T consents to the variation or cancellation and it will be irrelevant that T has in fact relied on the promise to confer a benefit upon him. Moreover, by virtue of s2(3)(b), an express term of the main contract may also require the consent of T in any circumstance other than those specified in s2(1). For example, it would be open to the contracting parties to specify the form in which the consent is to be given, in which case, T’s consent would be ineffective unless given in the form specified by A and B. In certain circumstances, the court has a discretion to dispense with the requirement of consent. Under s2(4), the court may, on an application by A and B, order that T’s consent is not necessary. The first of these is where T cannot be found and the second where T is mentally incapable of giving consent. Likewise, under s2(5), the requirement of T’s consent may be waived where it cannot reasonably be ascertained whether T has, in fact, relied on the terms in the contract between A and B. In these circumstances, the court has a power to award compensation to T. The 1999 Act provides for a number of defences to an action brought by a third party. Under s3(2), where T seeks to enforce a term expressed to be for his benefit against the promisor (A), A may rely, by way of defence or set off, on ‘any matter that arises from or in connection with the contract and is relevant to the term’. For these purposes, the relevant defence must be one which would have been available to A in proceedings brought by the promisee (B). Thus, A would be able to rely on any exemption clause in the main contract or would be able to pursue relief in respect of an actionable mistake or misrepresentation. The general rule established by s3(2) can be displaced by an express provision in the contract between A and B. Thus, it would be open to the parties to the main contract to narrow or widen the defences or set offs available to A or to exclude the availability of such defences altogether. The Act also envisages the possibility that there may be