there being no binding contract between the plaintiff and B concerning the sale of the horse. The case is complicated by the fact that, at that time, s 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677 specified that a contract for the sale of goods for £10 or more needed to be either accompanied by a memorandum in writing or some form of delivery or part payment. It was the failure to satisfy s 4 which largely led to the Exchequer Chamber to uphold the first instance decision. However, at first instance, the point concerning the need for some manifestation of acceptance does emerge clearly. For example, per Willes J: Felthouse v Bindley (1863) 142 ER 1037, p 1039

Felthouse v Bindley (1863) 142 ER 1037, p 1039 Willes J: I am of opinion that the rule to enter a nonsuit should be made absolute. The horse in question had belonged to the plaintiffs’ nephew, John Felthouse. In December 1860, a conversation took place between the plaintiff and his nephew relative to the purchase of the horse by the former. The uncle seems to have thought that he had on that occasion bought the horse for £30, the nephew that he had sold it for 30 guineas: but there was clearly no complete bargain at that time. On the 1 January 1861, the nephew writes, – ‘I saw my father on Saturday. He told me that you considered that you had bought the horse for £30. If so, you are labouring under a mistake, for 30 guineas was the price I put upon him, and you never heard me say less. When you said you would have him, I considered you were aware of the price.’To this the uncle replies on the following day, ‘Your price, I admit, was 30 guineas. I offered £30; never offered more: and you said the horse was mine. However, as there may be a mistake about him, I will split the difference. If I hear no more about him, I consider the horse mine at £30 15s’. It is clear that there was no complete bargain on the 2 January: and it is also clear that the uncle had no right to impose upon the nephew a sale of his horse for £30 15s unless he chose to comply with the condition of writing to repudiate the offer. The nephew might, no doubt, have bound his uncle to the bargain by writing to him: the uncle might also have retracted his offer at any time before acceptance. It stood an open offer, and so, things remained until 25 February, when the nephew was about to sell his farming stock by auction. The horse in question being catalogued with the rest of the stock, the auctioneer (the defendant) was told that it was already sold. It is clear, therefore, that the nephew in his own mind intended his uncle to have the horse at the price which he (the uncle) had named – £30 15s, but he had not communicated such his intention to his uncle or done anything to bind himself. Nothing, therefore, had been done to vest the property in the horse in the plaintiff down to the 25 February, when the horse was sold by the defendant. It appears to me that, independently of the subsequent letters, there had been no bargain to pass the property in the horse to the plaintiff and, therefore, that he had no right to complain of the sale.