another to believe that he has acquired an interest and that other has incurred some expense or has in some other way acted to his detriment. It should be emphasised that there are substantial differences in the way in which promises are enforced through the medium of rules based on estoppel as compared with the enforcement of promises under the doctrine of consideration. In particular, a promise supported by consideration, subject to other rules on the validity of contractual promises, will be enforceable in full against the promisor. In contrast, the equitable solution provided by rules on promissory and proprietary estoppel will reflect the equities of the case in hand and should not be regarded as a device intended to protect the promisee’s expectations of performance of the promise of the other party. However, where the equities so demand, it may be necessary to confer on the promisee rights which did not previously exist before the promisor indicated that the promisee was to acquire an interest in or over the land in question. Waltons Stores v Maher indicates the utility of estoppel as a means of enforcing promises where it is equitable to do so, but also makes it abundantly clear that the purpose of such equitable intervention is not to give effect to the promisee’s expectation that the promisor’s promise will be fulfilled. Developments along these lines in English law, it is suggested, would be desirable. As has been observed above, where there is a contractual promise supported by consideration, the promise will create fully enforceable rights in favour of the promisee, but the same is not true of promises which induce reliance in the absence of consideration. In some instances, a promise may be made which binds the promisor only temporarily, for example one made for a specific purpose during a finite period, and which temporarily suspends the promisor’s right to insist upon his strict legal rights until he has served reasonable notice on the promisee of his intention to revert to a pre-existing set of contractual obligations. In Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co, a landlord gave his tenant six

doi:10.4324/9781843141518-76

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another to believe that he has acquired an interest and that other has incurred some expense or has in some other way acted to his detriment. It should be emphasised that there are substantial differences in the way in which promises are enforced through the medium of rules based on estoppel as compared with the enforcement of promises under the doctrine of consideration. In particular, a promise supported by consideration, subject to other rules on the validity of contractual promises, will be enforceable in full against the promisor. In contrast, the equitable solution provided by rules on promissory and proprietary estoppel will reflect the equities of the case in hand and should not be regarded as a device intended to protect the promisee’s expectations of performance of the promise of the other party. However, where the equities so demand, it may be necessary to confer on the promisee rights which did not previously exist before the promisor indicated that the promisee was to acquire an interest in or over the land in question. Waltons Stores v Maher indicates the utility of estoppel as a means of enforcing promises where it is equitable to do so, but also makes it abundantly clear that the purpose of such equitable intervention is not to give effect to the promisee’s expectation that the promisor’s promise will be fulfilled. Developments along these lines in English law, it is suggested, would be desirable. As has been observed above, where there is a contractual promise supported by consideration, the promise will create fully enforceable rights in favour of the promisee, but the same is not true of promises which induce reliance in the absence of consideration. In some instances, a promise may be made which binds the promisor only temporarily, for example one made for a specific purpose during a finite period, and which temporarily suspends the promisor’s right to insist upon his strict legal rights until he has served reasonable notice on the promisee of his intention to revert to a pre-existing set of contractual obligations. In Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co, a landlord gave his tenant six

DOI link for another to believe that he has acquired an interest and that other has incurred some expense or has in some other way acted to his detriment. It should be emphasised that there are substantial differences in the way in which promises are enforced through the medium of rules based on estoppel as compared with the enforcement of promises under the doctrine of consideration. In particular, a promise supported by consideration, subject to other rules on the validity of contractual promises, will be enforceable in full against the promisor. In contrast, the equitable solution provided by rules on promissory and proprietary estoppel will reflect the equities of the case in hand and should not be regarded as a device intended to protect the promisee’s expectations of performance of the promise of the other party. However, where the equities so demand, it may be necessary to confer on the promisee rights which did not previously exist before the promisor indicated that the promisee was to acquire an interest in or over the land in question. Waltons Stores v Maher indicates the utility of estoppel as a means of enforcing promises where it is equitable to do so, but also makes it abundantly clear that the purpose of such equitable intervention is not to give effect to the promisee’s expectation that the promisor’s promise will be fulfilled. Developments along these lines in English law, it is suggested, would be desirable. As has been observed above, where there is a contractual promise supported by consideration, the promise will create fully enforceable rights in favour of the promisee, but the same is not true of promises which induce reliance in the absence of consideration. In some instances, a promise may be made which binds the promisor only temporarily, for example one made for a specific purpose during a finite period, and which temporarily suspends the promisor’s right to insist upon his strict legal rights until he has served reasonable notice on the promisee of his intention to revert to a pre-existing set of contractual obligations. In Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co, a landlord gave his tenant six

another to believe that he has acquired an interest and that other has incurred some expense or has in some other way acted to his detriment. It should be emphasised that there are substantial differences in the way in which promises are enforced through the medium of rules based on estoppel as compared with the enforcement of promises under the doctrine of consideration. In particular, a promise supported by consideration, subject to other rules on the validity of contractual promises, will be enforceable in full against the promisor. In contrast, the equitable solution provided by rules on promissory and proprietary estoppel will reflect the equities of the case in hand and should not be regarded as a device intended to protect the promisee’s expectations of performance of the promise of the other party. However, where the equities so demand, it may be necessary to confer on the promisee rights which did not previously exist before the promisor indicated that the promisee was to acquire an interest in or over the land in question. Waltons Stores v Maher indicates the utility of estoppel as a means of enforcing promises where it is equitable to do so, but also makes it abundantly clear that the purpose of such equitable intervention is not to give effect to the promisee’s expectation that the promisor’s promise will be fulfilled. Developments along these lines in English law, it is suggested, would be desirable. As has been observed above, where there is a contractual promise supported by consideration, the promise will create fully enforceable rights in favour of the promisee, but the same is not true of promises which induce reliance in the absence of consideration. In some instances, a promise may be made which binds the promisor only temporarily, for example one made for a specific purpose during a finite period, and which temporarily suspends the promisor’s right to insist upon his strict legal rights until he has served reasonable notice on the promisee of his intention to revert to a pre-existing set of contractual obligations. In Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co, a landlord gave his tenant six

ABSTRACT

It should be emphasised that there are substantial differences in the way in which promises are enforced through the medium of rules based on estoppel as compared with the enforcement of promises under the doctrine of consideration. In particular, a promise supported by consideration, subject to other rules on the validity of contractual promises, will be enforceable in full against the promisor. In contrast, the equitable solution provided by rules on promissory and proprietary estoppel will reflect the equities of the case in hand and should not be regarded as a device intended to protect the promisee’s expectations of performance of the promise of the other party. However, where the equities so demand, it may be necessary to confer on the promisee rights which did not previously exist before the promisor indicated that the promisee was to acquire an interest in or over the land in question. Waltons Stores v Maher indicates the utility of estoppel as a means of enforcing promises where it is equitable to do so, but also makes it abundantly clear that the purpose of such equitable intervention is not to give effect to the promisee’s expectation that the promisor’s promise will be fulfilled. Developments along these lines in English law, it is suggested, would be desirable.