ABSTRACT
Numerous factors contributed to the failure of the Kokand Autonomy, predominantly its military weakness – even at a time when the Russians in Turkestan were isolated and divided – and the governmental schisms and inexperience of its leaders. But perhaps the fatal weakness lay in the government’s failure to persuade the Emir of Bukhara that theirs was a cause worth supporting. Given the latter’s suspicions of the Jaddidists, his support probably could have been secured only by an unequivocal declaration placing Turkestan under his absolute sovereignty – hardly a welcome prospect to those who had direct experience of his arbitrary rule. United, or at least in alliance, Kokand and Bukhara might have been able to follow the defeat of Kolesov in February 1918 with further successes, and to hold off Soviet retribution long enough to forge an effective alliance with Malleson and the British government. Such an alliance would have involved the abandonment of all the political principles the autonomists held most dear, however, and afforded the Emir an opportunity to become even less accommodating once successful. In such circumstances, given their disappointment in the Bolsheviks’ performance, the wild gamble of the Kokand Autonomy must have seemed the only acceptable course.
