ABSTRACT

Introduction In 2005, Jordan’s Prime Minister proposed legislation that would have limited the opposition-led professional associations’ (PAs’) activities to purely professional ones, taken greater control of their financial and disciplinary matters, and amended their electoral system, among other initiatives. Any of these, if implemented, would have severely diminished the PAs’ political and financial power and influence, and consequently, the oppositions’ abilities to press political demands. The legislation, however, was never brought for a final vote in parliament, but the threat nevertheless worked. Despite the PAs’ strength, as witnessed by their massive demonstrations and presumably public support, the PAs restrained themselves – undertaking fewer political activities and quieting their demands. Political activities have continued, but they are generally less provocative and, with some exceptions, even during the 2011 Arab Spring, not been aimed at inciting the street. The question is why. Given that the government did not follow through on its threat or on an early one in 1996 (Nevo, 2001) why did they dampen their activities? Conversely, if the PAs are so strong, why did the government retreat from the legislation? Finally, what can the freezing of the 2005 law tell us about state-society relations in Jordan and in authoritarian regimes of the Arab world in general? The answer to the 2005 puzzle lies in understanding that opposition groups and the state are often engaged in a more mutually interdependent relationship than most studies of state-society relations in the Arab world would imply. As the prospects for democracy in the Arab world dimmed throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, scholars progressively shifted their attention to explaining enduring authoritarianism (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004), focusing on the role of political institutions (Haklai, 2009; Lust-Okar, 2005), rents, and other ‘survival strategies’ or strategies of adaptation which authoritarian rulers employ in order to maintain their power (Bank, 2004; Lucas, 2004). In these studies, the state is treated as powerful, if not all-knowing, and opposition groups, while not considered pawns of the regime, are largely portrayed as responding to state-structured incentives and disincentives by cooperating with or by engaging in conflict with the regime. With few exceptions, these studies

focus almost exclusively on the political goals, strategies and activities of both the state and the opposition. Yet, the notion that opposition actors within civil society play a solely political role is a false one. The dominant opposition groups in the Middle East, the Islamists, also are engaged in social and economic activities. As Islamist groups have come to dominate, through elections, a variety of civil society institutions, such as professional associations (PAs) and university student councils, they have had to deal both with audiences or clients who extend far beyond their political constituency and with the functional goals and the day-to-day working activities of these organizations. In the case of PAs, these would include professional licensing, for example. As demonstrated by the analysis of the relationships between the Islamist-dominated PAs in Jordan and the state, the functional goals and activities of both the state and these civil society organizations, the quotidian routines, partly dictate the relationship between state and oppositions. The Islamist opposition in Jordan’s PAs needs the state in order to carry out the functional goals of the PAs and thereby also assure their own political popularity just as the state relies on the PAs, and by extension the Islamist opposition, to carry out the quasi-state functions that the PAs have been mandated to perform and to help ensure economic stability. The end result is a state that appears less autonomous than most studies of enduring authoritarianism imply and an opposition that is less conflictual than commonly portrayed. A study of Jordan’s PAs is particularly useful for understanding state-society relations in the Arab world. As in much of the region, Jordan’s PAs historically have taken a leading role in pressuring for political reform (Longuenesse, 1990; Hourani, 2000; Kornbluth, 2002: Moore and Salloukh, 2007). The PAs, furthermore, are representative of PAs throughout the region in that the Islamist opposition has dominated the PAs since the late 1980s/early 1990s. However, in contrast to other Arab states (with the exception of Lebanon), Jordan’s PAs are not part of a corporatist structure and have relatively few institutional ties to the state. Institutionally they cannot be considered functional agencies of the state. Jordan’s PAs thus can be considered a “crucial” case study; evidence challenging the dominant literature and indicating an interdependent relationship between the opposition and the state in Jordan would indicate a similarly interdependent relationship in states with similar institutional structures or greater corporatist ties (Gerring, 2006: 49).