ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the arguments for teaching science through inquiry that have been made in science education. Beginning with Schwab, it looks at how such arguments have overemphasized the act of empirical inquiry and lacked a more detailed understanding of the epistemic and procedural aspects of this core scientific activity. Drawing on work from the history and philosophy of science, and those working in science studies, it seeks to show how more recent understandings of science have led to teaching a model of science that sees science as consisting of a set of science practices. It argues that the process of empirical inquiry cannot exist in isolation from the theories that it seeks to test, the analysis and interpretation of the data, and the arguments required to resolve conflicting interpretations. Moreover, such a model of science demands that students be taught explicitly not only domain-specific content knowledge but a body of basic procedural and epistemic knowledge that is essential to engage in the critical evaluation of any scientific activity or report. Furthermore, the learning of science is an activity that must not be confused with the doing of science—activities that have very different goals—and the reading, writing, and talking of science matter as much to the learning of science as engaging in empirical inquiry does.
