ABSTRACT
The word "constitution" has many meanings. Friedrich has suggested some of them. In their political sense, he calls them a set of rules insuring fair play. Other characteristics can be emphasized: philosophical, legal, and historical. And, as if the technical status of the term were not sufficiently questionable, mechanical questions arise which also make the intent of such fundamental laws and the scope of their application ambiguous. These include the form of the constitution, centralized or decentralized, its method of determination, its method of expression, written or unwritten, and its ultimate objects, i.e. whether it is built upon the established principles of a community, or a framework on which such principles can be established. As objects, methods, and forms change, so our evaluation of constitutions requires a shifting of ground, a different perspective. Because of all these factors it should not be a surprise to anyone that the term "constitution", while not lacking in repute, carries with it rather less respect than it did a generation or two ago. We expect less from fundamental laws than we did in the past. But we continue to use them none the less.1
