ABSTRACT
On a highly controversial topic like the one we turn to now, perhaps it is a good idea to begin with a few simple truths. The first is that actions are evaluated in terms of the range of likely consequences. A second is the principle of universality; we apply to ourselves the same standards we apply to others, if not more stringent ones. Apart from being the merest truisms, these principles are also the foundation of just war theory, at least any version of it that deserves to be taken seriously. The truisms raise an empirical question: Are they accepted? Investigation will reveal, I believe, that they are rejected almost without exception. The first truism may merit a word of elaboration. The actual consequences of an action may be highly significant, but they do not bear on the moral evaluation of the action. No one celebrates Khrushchev’s success in placing nuclear missiles in Cuba because it did not lead to nuclear war, or condemns the fear-mongers who warned of the threat. Nor do we applaud North Korea’s Dear Leader for developing nuclear weapons and providing missile technology to Pakistan, or denounce those who warn of possible consequences because they haven’t taken place. An apologist for state violence who took such positions would be regarded as a moral monster or lunatic. That’s obvious, until it comes time to apply the same criteria to ourselves. Then the stance of the lunatic and moral monster is taken to be highly honorable, indeed obligatory, and adherence to the truisms is condemned with horror. Let us, nevertheless, accept the truisms for what they are: truisms. And then think about a few crucial current cases to which they apply.
