ABSTRACT
One of the tasks of theory in the wake of Derrida might be the defence against certain misconceptions of his work. In this essay, I want to consider the work of Pierre Bourdieu and his critique of Derrida. Under focus will be Bourdieu’s attempt to replace the ‘ethical subject’ with the agent of ‘ethical’ habitus, a manoeuvre that often takes gift exchange, a key concern of Derrida, as its example. The notion of ethical habitus is clearly a challenge to the classical subject. Bourdieu further feels that his version of the ethical self escapes the paradoxes and dilemmas, the fear and trembling, the vertigo and paralysis, the demand of the other, and the perpetual questioning
of the ‘good conscience’ that makes up the ethical orientation of the subject in the work of Derrida, Levinas, Kierkegaard, et al. In Bourdieu, the agent of ethical habitus replaces the undecided ethical subject. Once I have detailed Bourdieu’s challenge to the classical or traditional conception of the subject, his notion of ethics will be raised and his response to the question of whether a disinterested act is possible will be given. Bourdieu will be seen to suggest a version of ethical habitus that leads him to proclaim a sociologically informed sanction on the philosophical question of disinterestedness. This leads him into confl ict with what he considers to be the ‘artifi cial paradoxes’ in the work of Jacques Derrida.
