ABSTRACT
Applications of cognitive psychology to science education have recently concentrated on classical physics. Studies have been made in several laboratories of the differences between novices and experts in their ability to solve problems in the physics of motion (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Clement, 1978, 1982; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980). In our own work (Caramazza, McCloskey, & Green, 1981; McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1980), we were struck by an important fact that must be faced by any cognitive account of how persons learn classical mechanics, as this branch of physics is called. Students do not come to the study of mechanics with a blank slate. They come with prior experience and with a good practical understanding of how objects move. They usually have some idea about the general principles underlying that motion. Unfortunately in most cases they are not quite right, and in many cases they are quite wrong.
