ABSTRACT

In the opening chapter of this book, Hiebert and Lefevre propose definitions of procedural and conceptual knowledge. Their analysis is thoughtful, and they offer some insights into possible distinctions between procedural and conceptual knowledge. Although these distinctions may sometimes be useful for the purposes of discussion, it is my contention in this chapter that it is the relationships among, and not the distinctions between, elements of procedural and conceptual knowledge that ought to be of primary interest. I argue that the distinctions between conceptual and procedural knowledge do not constitute sharp, impenetrable barriers and present some examples illustrating the powerful and complex interrelationships among elements of a person’s conceptual and procedural knowledge. The argument is based on the premise that although we can think of the distinctions between static elements of one’s procedural or conceptual knowledge base, when knowledge is used dynamically to solve a problem or perform some nontrivial task, it is the relationships that become of primary importance.