ABSTRACT

Nuclear power was on India’s agenda even before independence. Her leading scientists already had visions about using its potential for development and fashioning a world role. This was enthusiastically supported by the fi rst Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and has remained an important objective for all subsequent Indian governments, although the level of commitment has varied. Homi Bhabha, the great pioneer and implementer of this policy for almost two decades, charted out a three-stage process to lead India to nuclear self-suffi ciency. This envisaged developing technology which would eventually use thorium, available in large quantities in India, as the fuel-source. He was also clear that India should develop every facet of nuclear capability, including weapons. The nuclear establishment in the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has persevered with this vision, although its conversion into military capacity at the disposal of the armed forces is limited. During the last half-century, it may be noted that political leverage derived from nuclear weapon capacity has come primarily from possession and not from actual use. The Indian political leadership found the glamour of possessing nuclear weapons (and technology) irresistible, but was content to leave their development and control in the hands of the scientists. The disarmament agenda has remained under the purview of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), supervised by the Prime Minister. All management and control of nuclear affairs has always remained within a very limited group at the stratospheric, political, bureaucratic and scientifi c level.