ABSTRACT
The self has been an object of scientific curiosity for decades in psychology, and many centuries longer in philosophy. During that time research has arguably emphasized the study of mature self-concepts, but the developing self has become an important topic as well—in part due to the association between self-concepts and critical developmental outcomes such as psychological well-being, academic achievement, or engagement in risky behavior (Harter, 1999). Naïve developmental theories about the self abound, such as the expectation that babies are essentially lacking in self-knowledge while teenagers are preoccupied with the self—despite research suggesting adolescents are neither completely self-absorbed nor without reason for their enhanced self-focus (Vartanian, 2000), and infants are self-aware to some extent (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). But how, indeed, do we come to possess a self that organizes, guides, and motivates our expectations and behaviors? This question can be asked on many levels, such as how perceptions of oneself develop in context (at home, at school, across cultures) or what kind of mental representations of the self can be held by children of different ages. A relatively new approach afforded by technology, under the banner of “developmental social cognitive neuroscience,” examines the neural systems supporting the uniquely human capacity for personal identity throughout development.
