ABSTRACT
The distribution among the members of formal control over a collectivity's actions is an important element of constitutions. The exercise of such control is mediated by decision rules, which may be very complex, involving preliminary decisions by sub-collectivities within the larger collectivity. Framers of constitutions pay very special attention to the distribution of control and to the form of the decision rules, for these determine in large part the power of various members of the collectivity as well as the power of the collectivity vis-a-vis the members. Illustrations that give some intuitive feel for this are easily found. The bicameral form of the U.S. Congress, with equal representation of states in one, and equal representation of individuals in the other, and with a requirement that legislation be affirmed by both bodies, is one example—because there were, and are, two types of members of the United States, individual citizens as members and states as members. This paradoxical state of affairs, in which a federal body has a members both the constituent states and the members of these constituent states, was arrived at as one aspect of the resolution of the problem of sovereignty of states vs. sovereignty of the nation, and obviously reflects the outcome of a struggle between states with many persons and states with few, a struggle documented by numerous political historians.
