ABSTRACT
This chapter asks why decolonisation led to a dramatic new ‘East of Suez’ posture, rather than to residual garrisons and a gentle sunset over Britain’s eastern empire. It suggests it would be misleading to depict the ‘East of Suez’ strategy as the triumph of entrenched service interests over determined ministerial attempts at reform. East of Suez was not merely the unintended child of bureaucratic consensus or sclerosis. It was the conscious creation of the highest ministers and the COS alike – or at least the result of shared concerns and priorities. It resulted from a combination of the immediate security needs of Commonwealth territories, an ongoing process of strategic reviews, and ministers and officials’ assumptions about the importance of maintaining regional influence. In other words, it can not be explained in terms of colonial, Cold War or great power concerns, but only as a result of the congruence of all of these.
