ABSTRACT
South Africa is an anomaly among African states. It is more economically developed, has more skilled labor, a higher percentage of high school graduates, and more estimable universities than any other African country. Moreover, its governments have proven to be more stable and democratic, especially since the ascension to power of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994, when the voting franchise was opened to the entire adult population of South Africa. However, South Africa has also experienced a significant increase in violent crime during this time.2 This pervasive crime has made life more difficult for all South Africans. The concurrent development of popular, stable, and democratic government with rising crime triggers several questions. What have been the elements of government in South Africa since 1994 that have sustained the legitimacy of ANC governance? How has the terror-filled apartheid era affected the current paradox of violence from pervasive crime and intermittent jihadist terrorism with a seemingly legitimate, democratically elected government having broad national support? How has the rising crime rate affected such legitimacy and how has the lack of success in stemming crime affected the actions and beliefs of the population? How have people coped with ineffective police operations? And, finally, how has popular perception of the ANC been affected by the government’s problematic performance in controlling crime and violence? South Africa has also had one of the few homegrown jihadist terrorist campaigns in Africa. PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) mutated from being a communal anti-crime movement against local gangs and drug dealers into an organization of radical Islamist terrorists bombing crowded malls and restaurants in the greater Cape Town area. A radicalized PAGAD introduced jihadist terrorism to South Africa in 1995. However, Muslim inhabitants of the affected areas turned against PAGAD with defiant disdain after PAGAD elements began killing or attacking moderate Muslims. Although PAGAD cells may have withdrawn into the seams of Cape Town’s Muslim neighborhoods, their terrorist activities have been effectively curtailed since the mid-1990s. The emergence of PAGAD terrorism suggests that al-Qaeda or like-minded Muslim terrorists have the potential to instigate resurgent terrorist activities in South Africa. The ANC government under both Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki found a critical mass of Muslims in the Western Cape who would not tol-
erate the excesses of militant Islamism. Can this episode provide an example for other South Africans to mitigate the pervasive impact of criminal violence? And could the Muslim community withstand jihadist violence if it is directed against a splintered government losing its legitimate authority in South Africa?
