ABSTRACT
Introduction Learning by political elites-defined here as a “change in beliefs” following from a leader’s experiences or from a leader’s observation of events (Levy 1994)—is of particular importance in analyses of foreign policy decision-making processes and outcomes. If we are to understand how leaders interpret events, why certain types of actors are viewed as more threatening when others are seen as less so, which responses are generally preferred for given situations and why, and ultimately why these leaders act as they do, then we must look beyond an exclusive focus on domestic and international “constraints,” and examine the beliefs that leaders hold and how these beliefs come to be. There already exists a fair amount of scholarship examining individual-level “learning” in the foreign policy sphere. For instance, Jervis (1976) evaluates the impact of cognitive dissonance, the “last” victory and defeat, and the use (and misuse) of “generational effects,” amongst several other factors, on belief change. Leng (1983, 2000) expands on Jervis’s examination of the impact of conflict outcomes on “learning,” showing that losses provide powerful incentives for cognitive and behavioral change. Khong (1991, 1992) and Reiter (1994) discuss many of the ways in which “historical analogies” impact leaders’ interpretations of important contemporary events.
