ABSTRACT
In the literature on executive–legislative relations it is often argued that in parliamentary systems, the government controls the agenda. Martin (2004: 446), for instance, emphasizes that “it is the government, not the legislature, that determines the timing and substance of major policy initiatives.” In a review article, Obler (1981: 127) even says that “legislators do not legislate. Executives legislate.” When, he continues, “it comes to initiating and enacting policies that regulate public behavior and allocate scarce resources, few legislators have much independent authority.” Blondel (1990: 241) finds legislatures of Western European parliamentary systems to be “rather docile”; “governments can normally control the assembly.” As a result, Blondel observes, governments “can see to it that laws are passed in the shape which they wish these to have.” Thus, parliaments can scarcely exercise the constitutional powers they have. According to Tsebelis (2002: 93), every parliamentary government “is able to impose its will on parliament.” Governments are supposed to be able to control the legislative agenda by such means as monopolized proposal power, the possibility to use closed or restricted rules, gatekeeping power, “final offer” authority in parliamentary voting processes, and, of course, the threat of resigning and dissolving the parliament.
