ABSTRACT
Philosophers have been theorizing about the self and about the mind-body problem for centuries. From the viewpoint of modern psychology, theories pose pragmatic challenges of verification. Jung remarked wryly that lamenting the incapacity of science to prove the validity of subjective experience does not enable the psyche to ‘jump over its own shadow’ (Jung 1948: par. 384). Theories are the very devil, he says elsewhere, for psychologists’ interpretations of empirical material might be biased by their own preconceived hypotheses. Piaget (1971 [1965]) was more optimistic. Contrasting scientific psychology with the philosophical psychologies of Merleau-Ponty, Husserl, Sartre, and others, he suggested that misunderstandings between philosophers and scientists ensue from making a dispute about theories out of what is only a matter of method: ‘There is absolutely nothing in the hypotheses of the philosophical psychologies . . . that is in itself a priori contrary to a scientific position’ (Piaget 1971 [1965]: 164). Depth psychology had a partially parallel history, having emerged in the late nineteenth century out of psychiatry rather than philosophy. But the trappings of a natural science were intrinsic to its institution as a medical specialization. The burden of proof in this context implies not only providing empirical verification that one’s theory of human nature is correct, but also demonstrating its utility towards therapeutic goals. As psychotherapy, analytical psychology is ‘eminently practical. It does not investigate for the sake of investigation, but for the very immediate purpose of giving help . . . abstract science is its by-product, not its main aim’ (Jung 1928: 348-9).
