ABSTRACT
The rise of China as a major economic, political and military force in the Asia Pacific region has given rise to some speculation that it may eventually become a challenger to the status of the United States as the world’s only superpower since the end of the Cold War. There are different expectations as to what kind of regional and global power
China might become. Given its past record of involvement in armed conflicts, historical grievances against certain states, unresolved territorial issues, realist strategic culture, and some say its illiberal polity, many analysts expect China to behave belligerently – maximizing advantage against weaker states while engaging in violent contests for superiority with other big players, much like other great powers in the past. The “China threat” theory indeed appeared to have gained ground both in the West and in East Asia especially from the end of the Cold War up until the mid-1990s, influenced by such developments as China’s naval and air force modernization measures, assertions of sovereignty in the disputed South China Sea, and its holding of provocative missile exercises across the Taiwan Strait. But the “China threat” theory in Asia Pacific regional security discourses was
gradually moderated by China’s role in two important intervening developments – the evolution of new multilateral cooperative security mechanisms, and the regional response to the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. China’s engagement and even leadership in these two, along with its skillful diplomacy toward Southeast Asia, strengthened arguments that China had become a responsible stakeholder1
and a status quo power, rather than a revisionist one. China also showed how it continued to be committed to internal economic reforms and global integration, both necessitating a peaceful and stable external environment and thus giving its neighbors assurances of moderate behavior on China’s part. Historically, attitudes toward China by ASEAN states Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have indeed transformed.2 Indonesia under the Suharto government saw the danger of subversion arising from the
presumed nexus between China, the Indonesian communist movement (PKI) and the ethnic Chinese minority as the main threat to Indonesia’s national security. Even after belated normalization of ties with Beijing in 1990, Jakarta’s military and Muslim elite remained suspicious of China and often called for “vigilance” in their China policy.3 It was only toward the end of the Suharto period, especially after China provided generous aid packages and loans to cushion effects of the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), that Jakarta became more ready to engage Beijing. China’s support for ASEAN’s driving role in multilateral cooperation, as well as additional Chinese assistance following the 2004 tsunami, helped buttress China’s new image to Indonesia’s elite as a responsible power. To different degrees, this feared nexus of mainland Chinese subversion, local
communist insurgencies and an ethnic Chinese “fifth column” was shared by the governments of Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in their early decades of independence. Thailand, however, shifted course and began to seek China’s support after Vietnam’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia presented Vietnam as the greater threat in Thailand’s immediate backyard. Since the 1980s, Thailand has been in a quasi-alliance with China and is benefiting much from its military assistance, although the two sides differ on the issue of Myanmar.4
