ABSTRACT
When Kosovo declared independence, in February 2008, it was quickly recognized by the United States and by most of the European Union.1 However, just ten years earlier, these states had taken a very different view on the question of statehood for the province. In 1998, when the conflict first came to international attention, the prevailing opinion of the international community was that Kosovo did not merit independence alongside the republics of former Yugoslavia. Indeed, in the media it was often referred to as a ‘separatist conflict’.2 To this extent, efforts to resolve the situation were centred on providing the province with some form of meaningful selfgovernment. Indeed, even after the NATO intervention, in 1999, which brought to an end Belgrade’s direct rule over Kosovo, and instituted UN administration, some form of autonomy remained the preferred outcome for Kosovo. And yet, by late-2005, when the decision was taken to start status talks, it was clear that a change of opinion had already taken place. Instead of self-government, the mainstream view appeared to be that independence was the only viable option for the province. This chapter examines how and why this transformation occurred. It traces
the development of the Kosovo issue up until the start of status talks, showing that the move from autonomy to independence was a direct result of growing instability caused by the lack of a formal and finalised status, and the realization that any attempt to push for the retention of Serb sovereignty over the province would lead to further fighting. In other words, the argument that Kosovo required independence was not based on any change in attitudes towards the resolution of ethnic conflict, a wider acceptance of the principle of self-determination,3 or a change in the underlying principles of international law.4 Instead, and as will be shown, the decision to support independence in the case of Kosovo was based on the need to formulate an exit strategy in response to growing instability on the ground.
