ABSTRACT
As 1961 ended the conflict over the secession in Katanga was over – at least the agreement to end the secession was over – with apparent success. The initial negotiations, under the imminent threat of again resorting to the use of force to help things on their way, had established an agreed framework for ending the secession. Although there were early doubts over the willingness and capacity of one of the parties in particular to implement it, it seemed an impressive achievement. The upset it had caused in Europe and Africa, and not just in the Congo, was, however, considerable and matched only by the efforts of US and UN diplomacy to support and encourage all the participants to assist in the completion of an agreement. The opposition of some of the Western allies to the means chosen for carrying out the task was already in evidence and one question was whether particular European interests in the Congo would triumph over the general requirements of the Cold War which were centred on winning the hearts of minds of African people. The haste in which the agreement was reached at Kitona stemmed from Adoula accepting the deferral of decisions on the timing of the integration of the currencies and armed forces. The need to take further steps to ensure the agreed measures were implemented thus still remained.1 Even if the Belgian business community accepted that Kitona had to be implemented by Tshombe because there was no other peaceful solution in prospect, there were likely to be problems. The argument that anything which appeared as a diktat to Tshombe would strengthen the hands of the extremist secessionists like Munongo would certainly be hard to deal with.2
