ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates the J. G. Fichte overcomes the external relationality in his complex account of the social contract. It shows that his indeterminate concept of freedom stands in tension with his concept of community as an organism, and that Hegel’s criticism of Fichte in the Differenzschrift was on target, namely, Fichte’s separation of right from morality undermines his basic principle of freedom. Recognition is a transcendental condition and foundation of both freedom and right. The recognition of other is primordial, and consequently foundational, for the concept of right. One central and contentious issue in Fichte’s analysis is his separation of right from morality. When Fichte treats right as a relation, he characterizes relation as optional, contingent and conditional. Since contract involves a union of wills, and such a union implies intersubjectivity, it may be that Fichte’s analysis of social contract can provide a clarification of the relation between recognition, right and community.
