ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that the claim that in J. G. Fichte Naturrecht the human Leib appears as the concrete embodiment of the reflective faculty of judgment explored by Immanuel Kant in both parts of the Critique of Judgment. It discusses the argument with which Fichte progressively develops the characters of the human body as the condition for the “applicability” of the concept of right, and also, successively, for the definition of the person’s original right to property and self-preservation. The chapter provides some implications of Fichte’s argument by showing how they follow from his major transformation of Kant’s theory of sensibility. Fichte’s aim is to prove that the figure of the human body shows the rationality and freedom proper to the human being as “person.” Fichte observes that by relating to the other person’s body in an exchange of visible appearances and voice our body “acts” or exerts an influence even though it is physically still.
