ABSTRACT
Speculation has always been a central focus of the political economy critique of finance, and in this way it has remained within the parameters of a foundationalist ontology. Although more recent strands of scholarship have highlighted the inherently speculative character of economic action and argued that regulation is often imbricated with (rather than independent from) the speculative logics of economic life, they have stopped short of pursuing the implications for the problematics that have traditionally occupied political economists. To pursue such an analysis, this chapter suggests a reframing of the theme of performativity in terms of Luhmann’s understanding of self-reference, arguing that this provides a useful window on the connection between speculation and governance. It then develops these insights by reconsidering Minsky’s work, arguing that his postfoundationalist sensibilities deeply shaped his understanding of financial authority and central banking. The chapter also argues that, by connecting these insights to Hayek’s critique of rational constructivism, we may get a clearer perspective on the specifically “neoliberal” character of contemporary finance and its governance. The chapter concludes with reflections on the relation between speculation and critique.
