ABSTRACT
Utilitarians are welfarists about normative reasons for action. They believe that it is welfare and only welfare that provides moral agents with normative reasons for action. I first defend welfarism about reasons for action. I argue against the view that dignity, in addition to welfare, provides us with reasons for action. Second, I argue that welfarism about reasons for action can but need not be based on welfarism about value. Then, I discuss implications of welfarism about reasons for action for our treatment of plants. When it comes to plants two questions are relevant. First, is there such a thing as plant welfare? Second, how does our treatment of plants affect welfare? I will argue that plants, in spite of some claims to the contrary, do not have welfare. The answer to the second question is that our treatment of plants affects the welfare of animals and (as far as we know) only of animals (including humans) in various ways. Therefore, the only reasons we have to treat plants in certain ways and not in others are based on the benefits and harms for animals that our actions have.
